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ABSTRACT 
 This capstone report provides a cost effectiveness analysis of various radar 
systems capable of guiding the Multi-Mission High Energy Laser (MMHEL) from a 
Stryker platform. The Army’s Rapid Capability and Critical Technologies Office 
(RCCTO) is developing the MMHEL to provide a Mobile Short-Range Air Defense 
(MSHORAD) capability to maneuver units. The MMHEL requires a radar to cue the fire 
control system for target engagement. Past efforts to employ high-energy lasers have 
relied on large, stationary radars for target acquisition. The reliance on such radars limits 
a unit’s ability to maneuver and results in the laser being employed primarily from a 
defensive posture. To maximize maneuverability and enable the offensive employment of 
the MMHEL, the U.S. Army needs an on-platform radar that is compact and inexpensive 
enough to equip multiple Strykers within a Stryker Brigade Combat Team with the 
capability to engage targets from a mobile platform. The RCCTO is currently tasked with 
accelerating efforts to fill this need. The intent of this report is to assist the RCCTO in 
these efforts by generating a list of viable radar alternatives and conducting a cost 
effectiveness analysis to produce a recommendation of the most optimal solution. The 
results indicate that RADA’s aCHR radar presents the best value in terms of cost and 
benefit to the warfighter. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
1. High-Energy Laser Science and Technology Research in 
the U.S. Army .................................................................................1 
2. The Target Acquisition Problem ..................................................3 
3. Current Efforts...............................................................................4 
B. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION.....................................................................7 
1. Problem Statement.........................................................................7 
2. Scope................................................................................................8 
3. Key Assumptions ............................................................................8 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES.........................................................................9 
D. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS .................................................................9 
II. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION ....................................................................13 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ...............................................................13 
B. SYSTEM TRACEABILITY ...................................................................13 
C. MISSION BACKGROUND ....................................................................15 
D. PROJECTED OPERATING ENVIRONMENT ..................................16 
1. Operational Context ....................................................................16 
2. Scenario Overview .......................................................................18 
3. Environmental Conditions ..........................................................19 
4. Threat Details ...............................................................................20 
E. MISSION AND MEASURES .................................................................23 
1. Mission Success Requirements ...................................................23 
2. Mission Definition ........................................................................24 
3. Mission Execution ........................................................................25 
4. Measures .......................................................................................27 
III. METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................................29 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ...............................................................29 
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH ...........................................29 
1. Overview of Approach .................................................................29 
2. Description of Approach .............................................................30 
C. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS ...................................................................31 
1. Functional Hierarchy...................................................................32 
2. System Trade-off Analysis ..........................................................36 
D. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS .................................................................37 
viii 
1. System Requirements Introduction............................................37 
2. Operational Needs ........................................................................38 
3. Requirements Definition and Traceability ................................38 
4. Critical Technical Parameters ....................................................41 
5. System Supportability Considerations .......................................41 
E. COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS..................................................42 
1. Definition of Alternatives ............................................................42 
2. Data Overview and Estimating Methodology ...........................51 
3. Top-Level Screening Criteria .....................................................53 
4. Cost Analysis ................................................................................54 
5. Selection Criteria and Weights ...................................................56 
6. Benefit Analysis ............................................................................58 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY ..........................................................................59 
IV. RESULTS .............................................................................................................61 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ...............................................................61 
B. RISK ANALYSIS.....................................................................................61 
1. Operational Risk: Detection Range ............................................61 
2. Suitability Risk: Reliability, Maintainability, and 
Availability....................................................................................63 
3. Vendor Risk: Foreign-Based Options ........................................65 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.....................................................................67 
1. Possible Variations .......................................................................67 
2. Critical Factors.............................................................................70 
D. RESULTS .................................................................................................71 
1. Key Findings .................................................................................71 
2. Relevant Observations .................................................................72 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS .............................................73 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................73 
B. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................74 
1. Summary .......................................................................................74 
2. Project Objectives ........................................................................75 
3. Areas of Future Research ............................................................79 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................81 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................87 
 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Northrop Grumman’s THEL Concept. Source: Northrop Grumman 
(n.d.). ............................................................................................................3 
Figure 2. Influence/Impact Grid. Adapted from Project Management Institute 
(2013). ........................................................................................................11 
Figure 3. MMHEL Radar Traceability Diagram .......................................................14 
Figure 4. U.S. Army A2AD Description. Source: TRADOC (2018). ......................16 
Figure 5. MMHEL Radar OV-1 ................................................................................18 
Figure 6. Concept of Operations ...............................................................................19 
Figure 7. Tailored Systems Engineering “Vee” Approach. Adapted from 
Miller (2019). .............................................................................................30 
Figure 8. MMHEL Radar Primary Functions ...........................................................32 
Figure 9. “Detect” Function ......................................................................................33 
Figure 10. “Classify” Function ....................................................................................34 
Figure 11. “Track” Function .......................................................................................35 
Figure 12. “Interoperate” Function .............................................................................36 
Figure 13. SR Hawk V(2)E. Source: SRC Inc. (2017)................................................43 
Figure 14. Four SkyChaser Panels on an MATV. Source: SRC Inc. (2017). .............44 
Figure 15. ELM-2026B Single Panel. Source: ELTA NA (2015). .............................45 
Figure 16. ELM-2138M Green Rock. Source: ELTA NA (2019a). ...........................46 
Figure 17. ELM-2180 Watchguard. Source: ELTA NA (2019b). ..............................46 
Figure 18. eMHR Mounted on HMMWV. Source: RADA (2016). ...........................47 
Figure 19. RPS-42 Single Panel. Source: RADA (2019b). .........................................48 
Figure 20. aCHR Single Panel. Source: RADA (2019a). ...........................................48 
Figure 21. eCHR Single Panel. Source: RADA (2019a). ...........................................49 
x 
Figure 22. A400 Two Panels on a Mast. Source: Blighter (2017). .............................49 
Figure 23. Osprey Radar. Source: Leonardo (2017). ..................................................50 
Figure 24. Ranger R20SS Radar. Source: FLIR (2015). .............................................50 
Figure 25. Cost Effectiveness Chart ............................................................................71 
 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Stakeholder Register ..................................................................................12 
Table 2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Adapted from Jane’s by IHS Markit 
(2019). ........................................................................................................21 
Table 3. Rotary Wing Aircraft. Adapted from Jane’s by IHS Markit (2019). .........21 
Table 4. Fixed Wing Aircraft. Adapted from Military Factory 
(2019a)(2019b). .........................................................................................22 
Table 5. Artillery and Rockets. Adapted from Jane’s by IHS Markit (2019). .........22 
Table 6. Mortar System Types. Adapted from Jane’s by IHS Markit (2019). .........23 
Table 7. Requirements Definitions and Traceability ...............................................39 
Table 8. MMHEL Radar Vendor Data.....................................................................53 
Table 9. Screening Criteria Matrix ..........................................................................54 
Table 10. Radar Cost Estimates .................................................................................55 
Table 11. Radar Benefit Scores..................................................................................57 
Table 12. Potential RMA Issues. Adapted from DOD Guide for Achieving 
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (2005). ................................65 
Table 13. Weighting Sensitivity Analysis..................................................................69 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
A2AD   anti-access, area denial  
ADRP   Army Doctrine Reference Publication  
AFATDS  Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
ARSTRAT  Army Forces Strategic Command  
BCT   Brigade Combat Team  
CATS   Combined Arms Training Strategy  
COTS   commercial off-the-shelf  
C-RAM  Counter Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars 
CTP   critical technical parameter 
DOD    Department of Defense  
DOTMLPF  Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, 
and Facilities  
DRM   Design Reference Mission  
FCS   fire control system  
FOV    field of view  
FW   fixed wing 
GSR   ground surveillance radar 
ISR   intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  
KPP   key performance parameter 
kW   kilowatt  
Mct   mean corrective maintenance time 
MEHEL  Mobile Experimental High-Energy Laser  
MFIX   Maneuver and Fires Integrated Experiment 
MMHEL  Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser 
M-SHORAD  Maneuver Short Range Air Defense Weapon System  
MTBF   mean time between failure 
MTTR   mean time to repair 
NSS   National Security Strategy  
xiv 
(O)   objective 
OPSIT   operational situations  
OTA   other transaction authority  
RAM   rocket, artillery, and mortars  
RCCTO  Rapid Capability and Critical Technologies Office  
RCS   radar cross section  
RMA   reliability, maintainability, and availability 
RSOI   Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement, and Integration  
RW   rotary wing 
SBCT   Stryker Brigade Combat Team  
SOF   Special Operations Force  
SSL   solid state laser  
SOP   standard operating procedures 
SWaP-C  Size, Weight, Power, and Cooling  
(T)   threshold 
THEL    Tactical High-Energy Laser 
TRADOC  U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command  
TRL   technology readiness level 
UAS   unmanned aircraft systems  
USASMDC  U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command 

















The U.S. Army has increased efforts to develop directed energy weapons over the 
past several years. Among these efforts is the Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser 
(MMHEL), a 50-kW laser designed to provide a Mobile Short-Range Air Defense 
(MSHORAD) capability to maneuver units. The MMHEL, like all laser weapons, requires 
a radar to direct the beam to its intended target. Previous efforts to employ lasers have 
relied on large, stationary radars to serve this function. The reliance on such radars limits 
a unit’s maneuverability and forces the weapon to be used primarily from a defensive 
posture.  
The Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) is 
leading the MMHEL developmental effort. To maximize maneuverability and enable the 
offensive employment of the MMHEL, the RCCTO intends to mount radars on individual 
Stryker vehicles to provide an on-platform mechanism for target acquisition. The intent of 
this report is to assist the RCCTO in its ongoing search for such a radar, and in doing so, 
address the issue that the U.S. military currently lacks a radar capable of guiding the 
MMHEL that is compact and inexpensive enough to equip multiple Strykers in a Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team with the capability to engage targets on the move. 
The project team conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis to determine what radar 
provides the best value in terms of performance and cost. Based on this analysis, the team 
recommends that the RCCTO procure RADA’s aCHR for integration with the MMHEL. 
Figure 1 depicts the results of the cost-effectiveness analysis. While all the radar 
alternatives included in this study present unique capabilities, the aCHR provides the 
highest overall benefit at the lowest cost to the government. Certain radars, such as the 









Figure 1. Cost-Effectiveness Chart 
 
The team has two additional recommendations. The first is that the RCCTO conduct 
further testing to verify the raw data reported by the vendors. The project team 
acknowledges that the MMHEL Radar cost-effectiveness analysis relies on two 
fundamental assumptions. First, the study uses raw data from contractor fact sheets. 
Reporting bias potentially affects the pedigree of this data, as objective third-party testers 
have not verified the accuracy of the contractor data. Similarly, the project team relied on 
historical costs of analogous radar systems or contractor quotes to arrive at a cost estimate 
for most of the MMHEL Radar alternatives. While these cost estimates are certainly 
informed, they are inevitably imprecise. Consequently, the project team recommends that 
the RCCTO confirm the veracity of the data used in its own cost-effectiveness analysis.  
The final recommendation is that the RCCTO revisit its weighting of the desired 
system attributes to ensure that they accurately reflect the decision maker’s priorities. The 
sensitivity analysis conducted in support of this study indicates that the manipulation of 
certain attributes’ weights could result in a different radar presenting the best value. If it is 
later decided, for example, that 360-degree coverage is more important than what is 
currently reflected in the weighting scheme, or that size is not as important as originally 
thought, results of the analysis will be significantly different. The RCCTO’s revalidation 
of priorities, acknowledging that priorities can evolve over time, will increase the accuracy 
of the study’s results and better inform the stakeholder’s selection decision.  
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The team largely followed processes outlined in the Army Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Guide (2013) to arrive at these recommendations. This process was informed by additional 
analysis, which included a functional and requirements analysis as well as an analysis of 
risks and weighting sensitivity.  
This study initially considered 12 different radar alternatives from six separate 
vendors. The team conducted market research to gain data in particular areas of interest, 
like radar detection range, which were derived from the RCCTO’s prescribed selection 
criteria. This data was consolidated in Table 1 to enable a quick comparison of all 12 
alternatives. 
Table 1. MMHEL Radar Vendor Data 
Three top-level screening criteria were applied to the 12 alternatives to determine 
entrance into the cost-effectiveness study. The first criterion was that the radar be capable 
of performing MSHORAD operations. This is the primary function of the MMHEL, 
making it a non-negotiable attribute of the radar. The second criterion was that the radar 
be capable of being mounted on a ground vehicle. This is critical as the radar’s intended 
platform is a Stryker. The final and most exclusive criterion was that the radar be capable 
of operating while on-the-move. This function is necessary to provide the unique capability 
of employing the MMHEL while the platform is in motion. These three criteria eliminated 
six alternatives from consideration, leaving six alternatives from three different vendors as 
subjects of the cost-effectiveness analysis.  
The team conducted a cost analysis on the remaining six alternatives, which are 
listed in Table 2. Verified cost data was received for the SRC SkyChaser and RADA RPS-
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42, while a parametric cost estimating method was applied to determine the costs of the 
remaining radar alternatives. This method involved using detection range as an 
independent variable to develop a cost estimating relationship, as detection range was 
identified as a major cost driver for radar systems. This study uses cost data from the two 
verified alternatives and a third analogous radar system, the AN/TPQ-50, to generate three 
separate cost estimates for each of the remaining radar alternatives. These three estimates 
were then averaged together to produce a single cost estimate for each radar. 
Table 2. Radar Cost Estimates 
The cost analysis was followed by an analysis of both the quantitative and 
qualitative benefits of each alternative. The quantitative benefits, which are outlined in 
Table 3, illustrate how well each alternative fulfills the RCCTO’s requirements. Each 
alternative’s score is the sum of every performance attribute’s weighted value, with the 
highest sum representing the radar with the greatest quantitative benefit to the warfighter. 
The ELM-2138M scores the highest, mostly due to its superior detection ranges and light 
weight. However, these detection ranges are somewhat constrained by the radar’s limited 
field of view, which is 180 degrees as opposed to the desired 360 degrees. The radar’s light 
weight is also a product of this limited coverage, as the radar system only consists of two 
radar panels instead of the four panels that comprise each of the other alternatives. The 
SkyChaser has the second highest benefit score at 0.64, primarily due to its relatively low 
size and weight. The four remaining RADA products have comparable benefit scores, 
offsetting comparative advantages over each other in size or weight with lower scores in 
other categories, like detection range. 
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Table 3. Radar Benefit Scores 
 
 
It is important also to consider the qualitative benefits of the radar alternatives. Each 
of the remaining radar alternatives has particular capabilities that may not be quantifiable, 
but present valuable decision-making considerations to the RCCTO. Among these benefits 
is interoperability with other systems. The SkyChaser, for example, is compatible with 
existing mission command systems such as the AFATDS, which would enable a unit to 
digitally send target data to other systems within the area of operations. A second benefit, 
found mostly in the RADA alternatives, is mission flexibility. RADA’s eMHR, as outlined 
in its 2016 data sheet, offers multiple operating modes on one product, including the ability 
to tune the radar to mission-dependent sensitivity configurations based on likely threat 
signatures. The aCHR adds the capability of tracking ground targets in addition to aerial 
threats, which provides options to broaden the scope of the MMHEL’s use in the future. 
The RADA alternatives’ panel design also provides flexibility in how it can be mounted 
on the Stryker. Conversely, the ELM-2138M’s design lacks flexibility, as it is specifically 
designed to be affixed to the top of a vehicle. This increases the vehicle’s tactical profile 
and potentially obstructs the view of the vehicle commander. These benefits must be 
considered in conjunction with the aforementioned quantitative benefits to gain a holistic 
understanding of the capability each radar would provide the warfighter.  
The project team completed the cost-effectiveness analysis by multiplying the 
summed benefit factors by the projected per unit price of each radar. The resulting values, 
which are listed in Table 4, reflect which radar provides the greatest benefit at the best 
price. These values were also depicted in the Cost-Effectiveness Chart (Figure 1). The 
xx 
values in Table 4 are listed to the third decimal place, not with the intent to communicate 
a superficial accuracy in the results, but rather to highlight the slight differences in the final 
scores. The aCHR is ranked the highest, followed closely by the ELM-2138M and eCHR. 
 
Table 4. Cost Effectiveness Ratio 
 
 
The relatively small differences in the cost-effectiveness ratios of the top three 
radars suggest that the weights of the different performance attributes may influence the 
results more than intended. The team conducted a sensitivity analysis using four weighting 
variations to determine how manipulating these weights may impact the results. The 
relative weights and outcomes of the possible variations are depicted in Table 5. The first 
scenario is reflective of the sponsor’s input and serves as a comparative baseline. The 
results of these weights are what is reflected in Table 4.  
In a second scenario, all selection criteria are set to equal weighting. This scenario 
does not consider one attribute any more important than another, therefore complementing 
the first scenario’s baseline. As a result, the top three radar alternatives remain unchanged; 
although, the ELM-2138M slips to third because the equal weighting of the attributes 
mitigates its comparative advantage in detection range. This indicates that the results will 






Table 5. Weighting Sensitivity Analysis 
The third scenario prioritizes detection range over all other attributes. Detection 
range is the system attribute most closely linked to technical maturity, and as such could 
be considered the most important selection criteria. The third scenario allocates a combined 
75 percent of the weight to detection range, reflecting the need for superior detection range 
in an era of near-peer competition. Under this weighting scheme, the ELM-2138M’s 
superiority in raw detection ranges elevate it to first, while the two RADA products trail at 
a distant second and third. However, similar to the second scenario, the top three 
alternatives remain the same.  
The fourth scenario assigns a weight to Field of View-Azimuth that is equal to the 
aggregated weight of the detection ranges. Asymmetrical battlefields require 
responsiveness and rapid target acquisition from employed weapon systems, making it 
feasible to consider a 360-degree coverage capability as equally important as detection 
range. As a result, RADA’s aCHR, eCHR, and RPS-42 are ranked first to third 
respectively. As expected, this manipulation in weighting of the Field of View-Azimuth 
attribute dropped the ELM-2138M to fifth in the ranking. Of the three additional scenarios, 
this scenario resulted in the most significant changes, which highlights the sensitivity of 
the comparatively small Field of View-Azimuth weighting of the RCCTO’s scale. 
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The final component of the sensitivity analysis investigates the impact of the cost 
estimates used in the comparative analysis. Since most costs are based on analogous 
estimates, this scenario mitigates any bias by assuming all costs are equal. Therefore, the 
cost sensitivity solely compares benefit scores using the RCCTO-informed attribute 
weighting. As a result, the ELM-2138M ranks first among the alternatives due to its 
comparative advantages in detection range, while SRC’s SkyChaser ranks second driven 
by its relatively smaller size and lighter weight. However, RADA’s aCHR still ranks in the 
top three alternatives. The complete results are illustrated in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Cost Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
The sensitivity analysis indicates that the relative difference in benefit score 
between the top three radar alternatives is highly dependent on the weighting scheme. 
Therefore, a decision maker presented with these radar alternatives must ensure the weights 
are truly reflective of the organization’s priorities. With this consideration, the aCHR 
provides the best value and is the most cost-effective solution. The aCHR ranked in the top 
three of all alternatives in all five sensitivity scenarios, scoring the highest in three of those 
five scenarios. Still, the aCHR’s cost estimate is assumed from analogous estimates and 
should be re-evaluated against comparative systems when verified cost estimates become 
available. The ELM-2138M provides the greatest detection range of all the alternatives. 
However, further analysis should be conducted on the MMHEL’s physical dimensions to 
determine if the ELM-2138M’s top-mounted design would interfere with the laser’s 
operation. Additional tests could also determine whether the ELM-2138M can provide 
xxiii 
360-degree coverage if mounted counter-directionally on multiple vehicles. If these issues 
remain unresolved, the ELM-2138M can be eliminated from the comparative analysis, 
leaving the aCHR as the primary candidate. 
This report serves as a critical step forward in the process of equipping multiple 
Strykers in a Brigade Combat Team with the capability to employ the MMHEL from an 
offensive posture. While the content of this report will help inform the RCCTO’s 2021 
technology demonstration, there are significant opportunities for future research. This 
future research may include a level of modeling and simulation that assists in the evaluation 
of FY23 MMHEL Radar alternatives as the program advances through its acquisition 
timeline. Regardless of the particular effort, maintaining a close relationship with the 
RCCTO and delivering this critical capability to the warfighter is paramount. 
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1. High-Energy Laser Science and Technology Research in the U.S.
Army
The Defense Science Board (2001) concluded that a national investment in high-
energy laser technology was not only necessary but could potentially serve as a paradigm 
shift in weapon engagement speed and supportability. According to General (R) Larry 
Welch and Mr. Donald Latham, who co-authored the Defense Science Board study, “the 
potential for speed of light engagement, unique damage mechanisms, greatly enhanced 
multi-target engagement, and deep magazines suggest a new level of flexibility and 
adaptability, attributes that are particularly valuable in the complex national security 
environment currently existing and unfolding” (Defense Science Board 2001). The 
investment in laser technology would greatly benefit the military by adding flexibility to 
the U.S. government arsenal of weapon systems.  
The United States Department of Defense (DOD) has spent several decades 
researching and testing directed energy weapons. High-energy lasers were of particular 
interest due to the multitude of potential applications across all the military services. From 
1996–2005, the U.S. Army worked with the Israeli military and Northrop Grumman to 
develop the Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL). The laser advanced through several 
development iterations and concluded with several technological demonstrations where it 
successfully defeated 28 Katyusha rockets, 5 artillery projectiles, 3 large caliber rockets, 
10 mortars, and 3 other rocket variants (Northrop Grumman n.d.).  
The THEL was among the Army’s most prominent attempts to develop laser 
technology for tactical use. The Army considered high-energy lasers for integration into 
the Future Combat System family of vehicles during its development, but the THEL’s size 
limited it to be employed as a fixed-site weapon system. The fixed-site aspect enabled the 
THEL’s integration within a larger family of enabling systems that allow it to detect and 
orient-on incoming targets by relying primarily on an organic, but separate, radar structure. 
The THEL configuration is an effective way to achieve a high degree of laser power and 
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radar coverage simultaneously because of the range and coverage that a large radar can 
provide. However, the set-up denies a unit its desired freedom of maneuver because of the 
constraints of a fixed-site system.  
The THEL program did not consider the Army’s post-Global War on Terror 
transition to a multi-domain force; a force that requires a higher level of maneuverability, 
operational access, and protection. The program certainly did not account for the 
resurgence of state actors, such as China and Russia, and their growing capability to 
employ measures that deny U.S. forces freedom of maneuver. The potential ramifications 
of these measures, from the strategic level down to the tactical level, make it desirable to 
incorporate high-energy lasers into mobile platforms capable of penetrating adversarial 
defenses and engaging targets on the move. While incorporating a high-energy laser into a 
combat vehicle platform may not present a significant engineering challenge, incorporating 
the target acquisition system as part of that same platform requires further development. 
Figure 1 illustrates the THEL concept, which displays how the system relies on a separate 
radar for detecting the target. While the THEL itself is far too large for a combat vehicle 
platform, current laser and radar technology is improving the size to capability ratio. This 
technological improvement could help fuel efforts to equip the Army with an on-platform 
high-energy laser and radar system.  
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Figure 1.  Northrop Grumman’s THEL Concept. Source: Northrop Grumman 
(n.d.). 
2. The Target Acquisition Problem
It has been 18 years since publication of the Defense Science Board findings. The 
Board found that high-energy laser technologies presented the DOD with an investment 
opportunity for low-cost air defense capabilities. Other technological improvements have 
created a defense market for smaller and more precise high-energy lasers. Technology 
associated with high-energy lasers is currently mature enough to conduct technology 
demonstrations for real-world application. However, there are issues associated with target 
acquisition systems at the tactical level; issues that are highlighted even greater in a multi-
domain environment, in which surface combatants are not the only threats present. The 
multi-domain environment contains a variety of threats other than service combatants, 
which includes rockets, artillery, mortars, rotary and fixed wing aircraft, and unmanned 
aerial vehicles. To effectively combat these threats, the U.S. Army requires a target 
4 
acquisition system that is capable of integrating with high-energy lasers on existing combat 
platforms.  
Historically, high-energy laser systems require additional system support to detect 
targets prior to engagement. More specifically, high-energy lasers require radars to acquire 
targets and to orient the laser. Radar-enabled target detection is not a significant issue in 
fixed-site positions, as demonstrated by the THEL program, but it becomes a major issue 
when the system is required to be employed while on the move. Fixed-site radars are large 
and capable of long-range detection in a 360-degree area, but they lack the capacity to 
move at the same pace as a maneuver unit. The most maneuverable fixed-site radars take 
time to set-up, break down, and move with a trailer, making them highly vulnerable to 
threats within a multi-domain environment. Attempting to achieve the same range and 
coverage of fixed-site radars with a vehicle mounted radar is nearly impossible with the 
existing market technologies. For this reason, high-energy laser capabilities are directly 
tied to whatever target detection options exist. According to Professor David Jenn of the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, longer 
detection ranges require larger antenna size relative to wavelength (Jenn 2008). In order to 
detect targets at longer distances, a larger antenna with a lower frequency is the ideal fit. 
This is problematic for a combat vehicle platform because of the resulting increased 
signature, among other things. However, several defense contractors, including foreign-
based contractors, dedicated significant research and development dollars in search for a 
potential radar solution. 
3. Current Efforts 
The current landscape of advanced foreign capabilities motivated the Army to 
investigate U.S. technologies that would provide greater force protection to troops facing 
near peer adversaries across a large variety of terrains. More specifically, low cost small 
unmanned aircraft, among other threat systems, are now easily obtained by adversaries, 
driving the need to pursue inexpensive countermeasures. The U.S. Army Space and Missile 
Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT) 
commenced an effort in 2016 that would demonstrate laser technologies to improve force 
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protection. The USASMDC/ARSTRAT integrated a 5-kilowatt (kW) laser onto a Stryker 
platform vehicle called the Mobile Experimental High-Energy Laser (MEHEL). 
Contractors demonstrated the MEHEL at the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat 
Organization’s Counter-Unmanned Aerial System Hard-Kill Challenge in March 2017. 
The system successfully defeated small rotary and fixed-wing unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS). Subsequently, Soldiers received training on the system at the Maneuver and Fires 
Integrated Experiment (MFIX) in 2017 and successfully engaged a UAS (USASMDC/
ARSTRAT-MEHEL 2019). MFIX is a two-week event designed to demonstrate and 
validate advanced weapon capabilities. The exercise considers changes in doctrine that 
could provide U.S. warfighters with a competitive advantage against adversarial threats 
(Guthrie 2018). Soldiers also tested the MEHEL at MFIX in 2018 and the Joint Warfighter 
Assessment in 2018. The Army upgraded the MEHEL to a 10-kW laser in 2019 for testing 
at the annual MFIX (USASMDC/ARSTRAT-MEHEL 2019).  
The Army’s Rapid Capability and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) 
accelerates such capability development to meet the Army’s modernization needs. The 
RCCTO assumed responsibility for developing the MEHEL, which it ultimately plans to 
develop into the Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser (MMHEL) to deliver Maneuver Short 
Range Air Defense Weapon System (M-SHORAD) capabilities. The MMHEL is a 50-kW 
solid state laser (SSL) designed to protect maneuvering forces from rocket, artillery, and 
mortars (RAM), UAS threats, and fixed-wing and rotary-wing manned aircraft. The 
system’s optical sensor also provides enhanced long-range intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR). The MMHEL will lower the cost per engagement and reduces a 
unit’s logistical burdens by neutralizing threats with no ordnance resupply requirements 
(USASMDC/ARSTRAT-MMHEL 2019). 
The RCCTO awarded a $200M contract to Kord Industries based in Huntsville, AL 
to develop the MMHEL. Kord Industries subcontracted with Northrup Grumman and 
Raytheon to build competitive prototypes to meet the Army’s requirements (Kord 
Technologies 2019). The competition will culminate with a procurement of three additional 
prototypes from the vendor that best achieves the MMHEL radar requirements for 
transportability, technology readiness, operational environment, and Size, Weight, Power, 
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and Cooling (SWaP-C). The RCCTO scheduled the first prototype demonstration for April 
2021, with hardware procurement set to begin in July 2020. The RCCTO contracted with 
the vendors with a cost-sharing strategy using other transaction authority (OTA). This 
contract type allows the vendors to demonstrate the 50-kW laser with whatever type of 
radar that enables them to do so, regardless of whether it meets the full list of requirements 
or not. This is because the intent of the demonstration is to prove the 50kW laser is capable 
of fulfilling the M-SHORAD mission, with less emphasis being placed on the type and 
capabilities of the radar itself. The RCCTO anticipates that the required radar 
subcomponent will not be commercially available for fielding in 2023. However, the 
MMHEL could potentially be fielded with a commercial off the shelf (COTS) radar while 
the Army pursues development of a more optimal radar that meets all the key performance 
parameters (KPPs). 
The radar sensor that provides target cues to the Battle Management Command and 
Control subsystem is a critical component of the MMHEL. Laser-based weapons generally 
require a separate radar sensor to illuminate a target and track its movement for beam 
control. The beam control system must be able to focus the laser on a precise target and 
stay focused on the target “like a blowtorch” as the target moves (Freedberg 2019). The 
MEHEL demonstrations utilized a basic Ku band radar mounted to the front of the Stryker 
solely for proof of concept (USASMDC/ARSTRAT-MEHEL 2019). The Ku band radar 
limited the field of view (FOV) to 90 degrees, minimizing its effectiveness in a combat 
environment. While larger radars that are organic to a typical Brigade Combat Team 
(BCT), like the AN/TPQ-53, can provide a 360-degree FOV, they are too large to mount 
on a vehicle platform and would limit the maneuverability required at the tactical level.  
According to the High Energy Laser Executive Review Panel Beam Control 
Working Group, “beam control refers to all functions required to transport a high-energy 
laser beam from the laser device to the target” (cite DSB). The working group found 20 
terms that encompass beam control. Ten functions and 10 components that are mostly 
present in all high-energy laser systems. Since beam control is a critical aspect of high-
energy laser systems, current development efforts in the military industrial base have 
focused efforts on creating beam control mechanisms for ground-based systems; however, 
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the target acquisition function remains one of the least developed aspects of beam control. 
The slower progress may be a result of interoperability with existing radar infrastructure in 
Army formations, or perhaps because the technology maturation process is lacking for 
target acquisition systems. Regardless the cause, the slower progress in this function of 
beam control made it a prime candidate for research. This capstone report focuses on one 
of the beam control functions: target acquisition.  
B. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
1. Problem Statement
The aforementioned 2017 demonstration of the MEHEL was among the Army’s 
first efforts to field an on-platform radar to support the beam control system and more 
effectively direct high-energy laser weapons. Prior to that demonstration, the employment 
of high-energy lasers relied on the unit’s organic radars to provide beam control, target 
acquisition, and other enabling capabilities. A Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) has 
six organic radars: two AN/TPQ-53 radars, which are currently replacing the older AN/
TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 variants, and four AN/TPQ-50 Lightweight Counter Mortar 
Radars. There are two primary issues with using these radars to employ high-energy lasers. 
First, the AN/TPQ-53 must be stationary to be employed, limiting the range in which the 
Stryker can effectively activate the laser. The second issue is that the limited number of 
radars places a constraint on when and where they are employed, often times being 
positioned in areas that hinder the laser from being employed as intended. Primarily serving 
as a protection asset, for example, these radars are more likely to be positioned near key 
mission command nodes rather than forward of the main body with an assault element. The 
overall impact of these issues is that both force the high-energy laser to be used as a 
defensive weapon rather than an offensive weapon; a weapon capable of being fired while 
advancing toward an objective. To use this weapon offensively, as well as improve its 
accuracy and lethality, a radar must be placed on the platform itself. This necessary 
condition highlights the problem: the U.S. military lacks a radar capable of guiding the 
Multi-Mission High Energy Laser that is compact and inexpensive enough to equip select 
Strykers in an SBCT with the capability to engage targets on the move. 
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2. Scope 
The scope of this project is defined by three key factors. First, the cost-benefit 
analysis will be limited to radars that are compatible with the Stryker vehicle. A fixed 
platform type will prevent external variables, like vehicle power generation or weight, from 
unduly influencing the results. The second factor that refines the project’s scope is that all 
analysis will exclusively focus on radars capable of guiding the MMHEL. The term 
“directed energy weapons” refers to a broad family of weapons, which includes lasers, 
microwaves, and other forms of highly focused energy. This project will focus specifically 
on the MMHEL, which is a particular type of laser that the U.S. Army is currently 
developing to provide Mobile Short-Range Air Defense (MSHORAD) capabilities. 
Finally, alternatives considered in our analysis will be limited to technology that currently 
exists or that will be available prior to the end of fiscal year 2020. This boundary is driven 
by the technology readiness level (TRL) 7 demonstration the RCCTO is conducting on 
initial prototypes in April 2021. Input received from key stakeholders influenced the 
project’s scope and directed the team’s efforts.  
3. Key Assumptions 
There are two primary assumptions that guide this study. First, this study assumes 
that the Stryker will continue to serve as the platform of choice for the MMHEL and its 
associated radar. Therefore, all concerns for the radar’s power generation, mount 
configuration, and systems integration center on Stryker-specific considerations. This nests 
with the RCCTO’s efforts, as the current technology maturation efforts focus on integrating 
the MMHEL on the Stryker. While the intent is undoubtedly to implement the MMHEL or 
a similar system across multiple platforms in the future, this study necessarily scopes the 
integration hurdles to the near-term time horizon. Finally, this critical assumption also 
enables a true comparison of various radar alternatives by holding the variable of a ground-
based weapons platform constant.  
Similarly, this study assumes that while the MMHEL currently focuses on an 
MSHORAD mission set, the long-term focus will broaden to include surface threats. 
Consequently, this study will primarily consider MSHORAD-specific radar attributes, 
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while incentivizing any radar alternatives’ ability to feasibly expand its capability for the 
search, identification, and tracking of near-peer surface and ground threats. 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
This capstone project has three primary objectives. First, the project seeks to inform 
the U.S. Army’s ongoing search for a compact, vehicle-mounted radar that enables the use 
of a 50-kW laser weapon system. This is not just a material effort, but must integrate the 
additional aspects of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, 
Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework to deliver a holistic competitive 
advantage. Beginning with a description of the current gap in capability, this study links 
user needs, as defined by current strategic joint doctrine, with the desired system attributes. 
While the Army has successfully demonstrated the capability of a radar system in 
support of a 5-kW laser weapon system mounted on a Stryker, the capability required to 
prosecute a near-peer UAV threat demands a vehicle-mounted radar array in support of a 
50-kW laser weapon system. Therefore, the second project objective, in concert with the 
RCCTO, aims to evaluate the various radar alternatives currently assessed to be 
technologically mature by the beginning of FY21. Presented as a cost effectiveness 
analysis, this evaluation is informed by measurable and weighted system attributes 
developed, in part, from the capability gap assessment conducted in support of the first 
project objective. 
Finally, this project assists in addressing the larger issue of the U.S. military’s lack 
of a mobile, ground-based mechanism for defeating a near-peer air threat in an anti-access, 
area denial (A2AD) environment. Therefore, this study looks at the operational context in 
which this weapons system will be employed. Since the RCCTO is still in the nascent 
stages of hardware procurement, this study constructs several mission profiles that may be 
used for further modeling and simulation studies of the various MMHEL radar alternatives. 
D. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
This project has several stakeholders. The primary stakeholder is the RCCTO, with 
whose efforts this project is intended to align. As such, this stakeholder analysis was 
10 
developed from the RCCTO’s perspective in an effort to better focus efforts at nesting the 
project’s objectives with those of the RCCTO. The early recruitment of key stakeholders 
allows the RCCTO to leverage a wide spectrum of knowledge which will inform the 
development of a solution to the identified problem.  
The capstone team conducted an initial brainstorming session to determine relevant 
stakeholders who are currently involved, or who may become involved, in the RCCTO’s 
technology maturation effort of the MMHEL. The output of this analysis is captured in the 
stakeholder register that has categorized stakeholders by using an Influence/Impact Grid 
(Figure 2). The grid is an analytical tool that provides a method of “grouping the 
stakeholders based on their active involvement, or influence, in the project and their ability 
to effect changes to the project’s planning or execution” (PMI 2013, 396). The four 
categories within the Influence/Impact Grid are defined as: 
• Manage Closely: Viewed as stakeholders who are most important and vital to 
the RCCTO’s success. These stakeholders should be continuously informed 
and prioritized highly. 
• Keep Satisfied: Viewed as stakeholders to keep informed with noteworthy 
progress and issues. These stakeholders are very interested in day-to-day 
updates that may affect their roles and responsibilities.  
• Keep Informed: Viewed as stakeholders to keep well-informed while ensuring 
they remain satisfied with the progress and direction of the RCCTO’s effort. 
• Monitor: Viewed as stakeholders who only require periodic updates. 
Awareness of RCCTO progress can be received monthly. 
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Figure 2.  Influence/Impact Grid. Adapted from Project Management Institute 
(2013). 
The Stakeholder Register outlined in Table 1 is expected to evolve and will be 
reviewed regularly to capture all necessary changes. The expected updates will occur when 
new stakeholders are added or when current stakeholders are no longer required to assist 
in the RCCTO effort. The accurate identification of relevant stakeholders is vital for the 
RCCTO to better determine how to leverage additional support as the effort progresses. 
The advantage of this process is that “it provides a clear, actionable plan to interact with 
project stakeholders to support the project’s interests” (PMI 2013, 399).  
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Table 1. Stakeholder Register 
   





Rapid Capabilities and 
Critical Technologies 
Office (RCCTO) 
• Leverage innovation from industry 
• Receive Warfighter feedback 
• Deliver solution on an accelerated timeline 
High High 
Current; Internal; Supporter 
Army Futures Command • Provide expertise and guidance to help integrate 
solution into SBCT 
• Oversee development and fielding of solution to the 
Warfighter  
Low High 
Periodic; External; Supporter 
Maneuver Center of 
Excellence (MCoE) 
• Update maneuver doctrine, training, and education to 
incorporate new solution Low Low 
Periodic; External; Neutral 
Combat Capabilities 
Development Command 
(CCDC) Ground Vehicle 
Systems Center 
• Integration of solution onto manned ground system 
• Utilize existing ground system capabilities as 
platform for the solution 
• Provide future development alternatives to fill long 
term capability gap 
High Low 
Periodic; External; Supporter 
PM-Stryker Brigade 
Combat Team (SBCT) 
• Involvement with all RCCTO decisions associated 
with Stryker Family of Vehicles (FoV)  High Low 
Current; External; Supporter 
Congress (HASC/SASC) • Continuous oversight of RCCTO progress on solution 
• Review funding request and authorize appropriate 
funding 
Low High 
Periodic; External; Neutral 
Assistant Secretary of 
the Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics, and 
Technology) ASA(ALT) 
• Continuous progress reporting to inform 
USD(AT&L) 
• Facilitate cross branch communication with Navy and 
Air Force Acquisition Executives  
Low High 




• Connect foreign technologies as options for solution 
• Strengthen ties with foreign vendors for partnership Low Low 
Periodic; External; Neutral 
Industry Partners • RFPs for prototype contracts 
• Completed designs to test    High Low 
Current; External; Supporter 
Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation 
• Provide independent and objective assessments 
throughout all testing 
• Determine that solution is operational effective, 
operationally suitable, and survivable 
Low High 
Future; External; Neutral 
Army Test and 
Evaluation Command 
• Assist with development of RCCTO operational test 
planning Low High 
Future; External; Supporter 
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II. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The Design Reference Mission (DRM) provides an operational context for the 
MMHEL Radar as a supporting component to small unit force protection in an anti-access, 
area denial (A2AD) environment. The DRM frames the employment of the MMHEL in a 
Stryker Brigade as a tool to combat UAS, RAM, and fixed or rotary wing aircraft. The 
operational narrative theorizes enough details to enable further scenario-based wargaming 
in a variety of similar combat environments. The DRM considers the MMHEL Radar’s 
role as a force multiplier that enhances the SBCT’s overall environmental awareness by 
slewing target data to adjacent friendly radar systems for improved fire control 
responsiveness. This reference mission postulates the use of the MMHEL system as an 
offensive weapon that offers a lower cost per engagement against aerial threats. The DRM 
highlights the MMHEL’s ability to conduct follow-on missions without the need for 
logistical support or added resupply requirements. This offers the RCCTO a basis for 
developing mission success requirements in the execution of the MMHEL Radar 
operations. This reference mission also defines measures for the system’s success in the 
realm of target acquisition; more specifically, how well the MMHEL Radar tracks, detects, 
and classifies targets. It also defines measures for how well the MMHEL Radar 
interoperates with the MMHEL itself and the Stryker vehicle.  
The following is the analysis question motivating the development of this DRM: 
How could an on-platform radar be employed to increase the mission success of a Stryker-
mounted Multi-Mission High Energy Laser, while reducing the latency in the target 
engagement sequence, as compared with an architecture that does not utilize a compact, 
cost-effective, and interoperable radar system? 
B. SYSTEM TRACEABILITY 
Prior to examining the DRM in further detail, it is first important to establish how 
the MMHEL Radar system nests within current strategy. Figure 3 depicts the system’s 
Traceability Diagram, illustrating how this system provides a critical capability at the 
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tactical level, which can ultimately be traced up to requirements outlined in the National 
Security Strategy (NSS). The 2018 NSS outlines four “pillars” of the nation’s strategy, the 
third of which being to “Preserve Peace Through Strength” (White House 2017, 25). This 
is further divided into three lines of effort, one of which is to regain the nation’s competitive 
advantage. The NSS states that the U.S. has displayed a high degree of “strategic 
complacency” over the last few decades, which has allowed a great power competition to 
return with large state actors like Russia and China (White House 2017, 27). This is in part 
due to the country’s involvement in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts over the last two 
decades, which has caused the majority of research and development efforts to be 
committed to more defensive-oriented weapon systems and those best suited for the 
counterinsurgency operating environment. This has allowed countries like Russia and 
China to invest heavily in the development of their own offensive weapons, as America’s 
focus in the Middle East provides little reason to invest defensively. One way to reverse 
this trend at the strategic level and to restore this “competitive edge” is for the U.S. to 
develop offensive weapons aggressively using innovative technology, like directed energy, 
to force countries like Russia and China to divert resources to the development of more 
defensive-oriented weapon systems and slow progress on offensive systems that serve as a 
proximate threat to national security. 
 
Figure 3.  MMHEL Radar Traceability Diagram 
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A second line of effort under the Strategy’s third pillar is to renew capabilities, 
which includes military capabilities. To address this effort, as well as address the rest of 
the guidance outlined in the NSS, each military service develops its own planning 
guidance. The Army outlines its plan to renew military capabilities in the second line of 
effort of the Army Plan, which lists the service’s six modernization priorities: Air and 
Missile Defense, Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future 
Vertical Lift, Army Network, and Soldier Lethality (Esper and Milley 2018, 7). The 
MMHEL and its supporting radar is a type of directed energy weapon that provides a 
unique MSHORAD capability because of its low cost per engagement, among other things, 
which directly supports one of the six Army modernization priorities. This system also 
supports operations in an A2AD environment, which will be explained in more detail in 
the following DRM.  
C. MISSION BACKGROUND 
The return of great power competition has elevated foreign threat capabilities to a 
level that forces the U.S. to prepare for a multi-domain conflict. The U.S. Army’s Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain 
Operations 2028, describe an operational environment comprised of Russian and Chinese 
A2AD systems employed in times of competition or times of armed conflict (TRADOC 
2018). This description, shown in Figure 4, illustrates that the A2AD environment will 
likely be saturated with adversarial indirect fire capabilities, which includes rockets, 
artillery, and mortars, unmanned aerial systems, rotary and fixed wing aircraft, and long-
range precision munitions. Chinese and Russian layers of stand-off vary slightly from a 
competition environment to an armed conflict environment. The primary difference exists 
primarily in the desired policy objective. Competition A2AD seeks to separate alliances 
and win without fighting, whereas A2AD in armed conflict seeks to win quickly in an 
overwhelming manner.  
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Figure 4.  U.S. Army A2AD Description. Source: TRADOC (2018). 
The MMHEL capability enables the U.S. Army to defeat threats in an A2AD 
environment, either while penetrating enemy A2AD layers or while preventing enemy 
encroachment into allied stand-off areas. The ability for maneuver forces to create 
operational access by forcible entry relies on the destruction of enemy anti-air and anti-
naval weapon systems by means of offensive fires. One way to reduce the threat to friendly 
air and naval forces is to employ these fires from ground-based systems. However, in doing 
so, these ground-based, often immobile, long range fires are highly susceptible to enemy 
targeting. The MMHEL provides ground force commanders a critical MSHORAD 
capability to protect these vulnerable systems from indirect and aerial fires, enabling their 
employment. Facilitating the employment of ground-based, long range precision fires, 
combined with the minimal logistical requirements of a laser-based weapon, makes the 
MMHEL the optimal system to employ in an A2AD environment.  
D. PROJECTED OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
1. Operational Context 
The 2018 NSS is clear about China’s antagonistic role in Southeast Asia. According 
to the NSS, China is using a multifaceted approach that includes the use of economic, 
political, and military means to influence other states to favor its political and security 
concerns (White House 2017, 46). China’s current trade strategies and infrastructure 
investments are evidence of their desire to influence Southeast Asia (White House 2017, 
46). China is developing its A2AD strategy to deny the freedom of maneuver and 
operational access of potential adversaries. Operational access is a key enabler to the 
pursuit of U.S. national interests in the Indo-Pacific region. 
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China’s strategy seeks to limit U.S. influence in the region while simultaneously 
increasing their own. According to OSD (2019), China has recently tested its strategy with 
some success by establishing a military presence on the Spratly Islands in 2018. 
Furthermore, OSD notes that China positioned ground-based, anti-ship missiles in the 
Spratly Islands despite Chinese President Xi Jinping’s pledge to not militarize the islands 
(OSD 2019, ii). The Spratly Islands are in the center of the South China Sea shipping lanes 
through which much of Asia’s trade currently passes. Additionally, the Spratly Islands 
potentially hold lucrative gas and oil reserves (Bonds et al. 2017, 25). As a result, it may 
be inferred that many nations within the region consider the Spratly Islands to be key 
terrain. Permanent occupation of the Spratly Islands would allow the Chinese to gain a 
distinct advantage within the region by extending their operational reach and providing an 
additional defensive barrier to deter any attacks on the mainland. This also would enable 
China to influence maritime operations and the movement of shipping commerce within 
its “nine-dash line,” an area of the South China Sea that China claims as their rightful 
authority to control. 
The United States can respond with a variety of military options in the event China 
extends its A2AD environment by weaponizing the South China Sea. Air and naval assets 
have the range and lethality required to defeat any threats deployed in the South China Sea. 
However, as mentioned in the previous section, the air defense and anti-naval weapon 
systems typically employed in an A2AD environment significantly increase risk to friendly 
air and naval assets. Instead, the Department of Defense may first choose to employ ground 
forces to defeat the air defense and anti-naval weapon systems and to enable follow-on air 
and naval strikes. This course of action establishes a joint, multi-domain posture within the 
region to deter a potential Chinese encroachment onto disputed island territories. 
The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) provides a highly mobile maneuver 
force that, when augmented with air defense capabilities, would be well-suited to fill the 
identified MSHORAD capability gap with the employment of the MMHEL. The MMHEL 
also provides the option to transition rapidly to offensive operations with the ability to 
engage enemy targets on the move. The system’s high-level operational concept is depicted 
in Figure 5, which displays how the system would operate in such an environment. The 
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deployment of MMHEL-equipped SBCTs within the region would provide the U.S. with 
mobile air defense assets capable of protecting the employment of ground-based long-
range precision fires and ultimately enabling the commitment of air and naval assets.  
2. Scenario Overview 
A Chinese Infantry Brigade has established a mission command node at the Spratly 
Islands to facilitate China’s plan to invade the Northwestern coastline of Luzon Island in 
the vicinity of Laoag City. A Chinese infantry battalion has been tasked to gain an initial 
foothold for follow-on enemy forces to occupy and emplace air defense and long-range 
missile systems on the island. The infantry battalion is escorting and providing security for 
an air and missile defense company to initiate the emplacement of these systems to support 
China’s A2AD strategy. The Chinese infantry battalion is also tasked to reconnoiter 40 
kilometers to the north of Laoag City and report suitable locations for additional air and 
missile defense systems. United States intelligence reports the possibility of a Chinese 
Special Operations Force (SOF) element positioned off the northern coast of Luzon to 
provide additional ISR support for the infantry battalion if needed.  
 
Figure 5.  MMHEL Radar OV-1 
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The U.S. Army has deployed one SBCT to Luzon utilizing the seaport of Batangas 
and international airports at Manilla and Angeles to rapidly facilitate Reception, Staging, 
Onward-Movement, and Integration (RSOI) and continued logistical support (see Figure 
6). The SBCT is tasked with clearing the island of enemy forces to enable the deployment 
of ground-based long-range precision fires. The SBCT tasks one company to conduct a 
movement to contact to identify and to maintain contact with enemy forces on the island.  
Figure 6.  Concept of Operations 
3. Environmental Conditions
The MMHEL systems provide the SBCT with a distinct ground force advantage 
over its enemy, but there are operational factors that could adversely impact the weapon 
system. The Army’s intelligence estimate is defined in Army Doctrine Reference 
Publication (ADRP) 2–0 as “a logical and orderly examination of intelligence factors 
affecting the accomplishment of a mission” (ADRP 2–0 2012, 5–9). Included in these 
intelligence factors are various weather elements. The intelligence estimate prepared for 
an SBCT will analyze weather effects “based on the military aspects of weather which 
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include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, and humidity” (ADRP 2–
0 2012, 5–3). Additionally, it is important to consider how other aspects of weather may 
affect the MMHEL’s performance in the projected environment and during sea transit. 
Minor assumptions were made on the system’s durability because it remains in the early 
stages of development and lacks environmental testing to date; however, MMHEL systems 
are expected to withstand or be capable of operating in the following conditions: 
• day or night operations 
• altitudes from sea level to 10,000 feet 
• temperatures between 0 degrees Celsius and 45 degrees Celsius 
• sustained winds up to 220 kilometers per hour (>119 knots) 
• heavy precipitation 
• heavy fog 
• sea spray  
• sand and dust 
4. Threat Details 
The MMHEL Radar must detect a variety of aerial threats. This variety requires the 
radar to be capable of acquiring targets with significant differences in radar cross section 
(RCS), speed, range, and ceiling. The threats include tier one, two, and three unmanned 
aerial systems, rotary and fixed wing aircraft, and a number of rocket, artillery, and mortar 
weapons. Understanding the capabilities of each of these threats is critical to inform the 
development and further refinement of the radar’s requirements.  
The following tables provide examples of each type of threat, accompanied with 




Table 2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Adapted from Jane’s by IHS Markit 
(2019). 
Table 3. Rotary Wing Aircraft. Adapted from Jane’s by IHS Markit (2019). 
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Table 6. Mortar System Types. Adapted from Jane’s by IHS Markit (2019). 
E. MISSION AND MEASURES 
1. Mission Success Requirements
Four high-level system requirements must be met in order for the mission to be 
considered successful. These high-level requirements correspond directly with the four 
critical functions of the system, which are to detect, classify, and track targets, as well as 
interoperate with the MMHEL. 
• The MMHEL Radar shall detect threats at a distance that allows sufficient
time to employ countermeasures that effectively combat the threat.
• The MMHEL Radar shall classify targets in a way that clearly distinguishes
friendly from enemy targets.
• The MMHEL Radar shall track threats to increase the accuracy of the
MMHEL.
• The MMHEL Radar shall send targeting data to the MMHEL to facilitate its
engagement of the threat.
24 
2. Mission Definition 
It is necessary to define a main reference mission as part of the DRM to provide a 
framework in which measures can be collected to assess the mission success requirements 
(Giammarco, Hunts, and Whitcomb 2015). This reference mission is named “Conduct 
Mobile Short-Range Air Defense Operations in a Resource-Constrained Environment.” 
This mission was developed to answer the following capability need statement: The U.S. 
military needs a cost-effective, on-platform radar capable of guiding the MMHEL that is 
compact enough to place on the Stryker to enable offensively-postured Mobile Short-
Range Air Defense (MSHORAD) operations in a resource-constrained environment. This 
reference mission consists of several operational situations (OPSITs), which are notional 
scenarios that capture a collection of variables to help define the mission’s environmental 
conditions. The following section defines two primary OPSITs, both of which introduce 
unique variables that highlight the radar’s critical attributes. 
a. OPSIT 1 – Stryker Unit Receives Mortar Fire during Movement to Contact  
In response to China’s forcible occupation of the island of Luzon, U.S. leaders 
deploy a land force composed, in part, of MMHEL-equipped Strykers to destroy enemy 
forces and restore the island’s sovereignty. Among the first to land on the southeastern part 
of the island is a Stryker company, consisting of three platoons that each contain two 
MMHEL-equipped Strykers and two standard Strykers. The company conducts a 
movement to contact, traveling overwatch in a company wedge formation at approximately 
30 mph from southeast to northwest. The radars on every MMHEL-equipped Stryker are 
in operational mode, actively emitting signals to detect potential threats in support of their 
MSHORAD mission. The company’s mission is to gain and maintain contact with the 
enemy to enable a follow-on assault force to destroy the enemy. Positioned in the northwest 
region of the island are several 60mm mortar positions that are providing indirect fire 
support to enemy forces. An enemy forward observer gains observation of the U.S. Stryker 
company advancing toward his position at approximately 1530. A high cloud ceiling 
provides clear visibility to both U.S. and enemy forces. The observer alerts the forward-
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most mortar pit that the lead U.S. element is within 3000 meters of their location. The 
mortar crew fires a 60 mm mortar round at the approaching Stryker Company. 
b. OPSIT 2 – Mobile Area Defense against UAV Swarm
Following the initial attack on China’s invasion force on Luzon, coalition forces 
assume a defensive posture in the northwestern section of the island amidst consolidation 
and reorganization activities. The presence of Chinese naval threats in the vicinity of Luzon 
prevent the regular resupply of CL V ammunition. China has also stationed several SOF-
manned surface vessels disguised as fishing boats approximately 40 km north of Luzon in 
preparation for reconnoitering a route to counterattack coalition forces. An MMHEL-
equipped Stryker task force conducts a mobile area defense in the vicinity of Pagudpud, 
employing roving patrols of platoon-sized elements. Starting at 0230 on D+3, one such 
patrol is traveling overwatch in a column formation from west to east along Route AH26 
at a march rate of 15 mph. The sky is overcast, with gentle winds of 5 mph from the 
southwest bringing warm, tropical air that leaves overnight temperatures hovering around 
80 degrees Fahrenheit, while humidity remains constant at 85%. Visibility is limited to two 
miles due to the low cloud ceiling, inhibiting naked eye observation of air traffic overhead. 
This particular patrol has been briefed on the possibility of Chinese SOF operating in the 
vicinity of Pagudpud, and remain vigilant for signs of an enemy counterattack. 
Accordingly, the MMHEL Radars are set to active search mode and scan the airspace north 
of Luzon. At 0250, the Chinese SOF launch a UAV swarm of ten quadcopters from their 
fishing vessels, moving toward Pagudpud at an airspeed of 125 mph. At 0310, the lead 
MMHEL-equipped Stryker’s radar system detects a target of interest approximately 30 km 
north of Pagudpud on a magnetic azimuth of 175 degrees. 
3. Mission Execution
a. OPSIT 1 – Stryker Unit Receives Mortar Fire during Movement to Contact
1. The lead MMHEL-equipped Stryker detects an incoming projectile at a
45-degree azimuth and 60-degree elevation. The projectile is
approximately 2500 meters from the company’s position.
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2. The MMHEL radar’s user interface alerts the operator of a potential threat. 
The operator, in turn, alerts his chain of command. The Stryker unit 
maintains its speed of 30 mph. 
3. The radar transmits initial targeting data to the MMHEL fire control 
system (FCS), causing the laser to orient in the direction of the incoming 
projectile. 
4. The radar classifies the target as a rocket, artillery, mortar (RAM) threat at 
2000 meters. 
5. The radar tracks the projectile’s azimuth, elevation, and speed while 
providing updated tracking data to the MMHEL fire control system (FCS). 
The forward movement of the Strykers, combined with the speed of the 
projectile, result in a rapidly decreasing distance between the unit and 
threat that requires the radar to send frequent data transmissions to the 
FCS. 
6. The remaining MMHEL radars that are not engaged with this current 
threat scan the surrounding airspace to determine presence of any friendly 
aerial assets in the area. The radars confirm there are no friendly units in 
the immediate airspace. 
7. The commander determines the airspace is clear and grants the MMHEL 
operator approval to engage the target. The MMHEL operator engages and 
defeats the mortar round. 
8. The Stryker unit continues its movement to contact without the need to 
alter its direction of travel, movement formation, or rate of march. 
b. OPSIT 2 – Mobile Area Defense against UAV Swarm 
1. The MMHEL Radar makes initial detection of an inbound UAV swarm 
through active air search at a range of 30 km. 
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2. Radar sends initial detection data to MMHEL’s FCS and friendly mission
command systems. Simultaneously, the radar’s user interface alerts the
operator to an initial target detection.
3. The MMHEL radar initiates target classification protocol and classifies the
target of interest as one hostile Group 2 UAV at a range of 60 km.
4. The Chinese UAV swarm continues on azimuth toward Pagudpud. The
radar rejects target clutter and recalculates the target classification at a
range of 20 km, identifying the target of interest as a target group of ten
individual Group 1 UAVs.
5. The MMHEL Radar sends updated target data to MMHEL FCS and
friendly mission command systems.
6. The radar tracks the azimuth, elevation, and air speed of all ten UAVs and
continues to send the target data to the MMHEL FCS and friendly mission
command systems.
7. The MMHEL operator receives authorization to engage and defeats all ten
Chinese UAVs.
4. Measures
The following tasks highlight the primary functions expected of the MMHEL 
Radar. Each task is loosely linked to tasks found in the U.S. Army’s Combined Arms 
Training Strategy (CATS) and to the Army’s MSHORAD initiative. While current tasks in 
CATS are directly linked to legacy platforms, the below tasks are similar to those focused 
on target acquisition, fire control system interoperability, and clearance of airspace. 
Specific measures have been assigned to each task to provide a metric for how well the 
MMHEL Radar performs these critical functions. 
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a. Conduct Target Acquisition 
 
M1 Percent Of aircraft detected within threshold range 
M2 Seconds Of mean time to correctly classify target of interest 
M3 Meters Of mean variance between true versus observed target location 
 
b. Interoperate with MMHEL’s Fire Control System 
 
M4 Seconds Of mean time to transfer target data to MMHEL FCS 
M5 Seconds Of mean cycle time for transfer data to MMHEL FCS 
M6 Percent Of failed data transfers 
 
c. Clear Airspace 
 
M7 Percent Of lost tracks once acquired 
M8 Seconds Of mean time to transfer target data to AFATDS 




A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The overall intent of this chapter is to provide transparency to the methodology 
employed by the project team in its execution of a preliminary cost effectiveness analysis. 
This chapter is comprised of three parts—the systems engineering approach, the functional 
and requirements analysis, and the cost effectiveness analysis—each of which contains its 
own objective that nests with the chapter’s overall intent.  
The first objective is to inform readers of the systems engineering approach taken 
by the project team to develop this report. The description of this approach highlights 
actions taken prior to the cost effectiveness analysis to frame the problem effectively and 
to better inform the process. The second objective is to illustrate the traceability of system 
functions to system requirements. This objective is achieved through a functional analysis 
and the identification of key system requirements. The final objective is to detail the 
processes included in the development and execution of the cost effectiveness analysis. To 
meet this objective, both the cost and benefit analysis are included in this chapter. While 
this may be more analysis than is normally included in a chapter on methodology, its 
inclusion is important to provide a fully transparent perspective of how the cost 
effectiveness analysis was conducted. Chapter IV includes the results of this analysis, as 
well as more detailed analysis into risk and weighting sensitivity.  
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
1. Overview of Approach
This report was developed using a tailored systems engineering “vee” model, which 
resulted in the development of a functional hierarchy, design reference mission (DRM), 
and a preliminary cost-effectiveness analysis for various MMHEL Radar alternatives. 
Figure 7 is a graphical representation of the process that captures each step and the resulting 
deliverables. The project team’s research effort was focused on the left side of the “vee,” 
stopping short of modeling, simulation, and further developmental testing. However, the 
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preliminary cost-effectiveness analysis produced by this tailored systems engineering 
approach provides the necessary modeling and simulation inputs for further research.  
 
Figure 7.  Tailored Systems Engineering “Vee” Approach. Adapted from 
Miller (2019). 
2. Description of Approach 
The project team began its approach by first exploring the initial problem space, as 
outlined on the upper left-hand corner of the tailored systems engineering “vee.” This 
exploration incorporates technical research, capability gap analysis, and stakeholder input 
to define the problem’s scope and boundaries. A succinct yet comprehensive problem 
statement is the main output of this project phase, as it focuses the research effort toward 
providing possible solutions to the critical problem. 
The approach continues to the High Concept Definition phase, which defines the 
project’s objectives based on the problem statement. The traceability diagram guides the 
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high concept definition by illustrating how the MMHEL Radar nests into the strategic 
context. The mission background further outlines how the MMHEL supports a counter-
A2AD strategy, while the operational context serves as a backdrop for the design reference 
mission.  
The project team then developed relevant mission scenarios as part of an overall 
design reference mission, illustrating how a Stryker-mounted MMHEL Radar may be 
employed in an operational environment. The design reference mission conveys the 
projected environmental factors, mission success requirements, and key performance 
measures against which an MMHEL Radar can be evaluated.  
Efforts advance down the left side of the “vee” as the project moves from 
conceptual elements toward a practical view of the specific system requirements needed to 
satisfy the operational requirements. Encapsulated in the functional hierarchy, the report 
outlines specific functions and critical technical parameters that a radar must possess to 
meet its requirements. This analysis also considers the longer-term supportability issues 
that, if satisfactorily addressed, would contribute to a deliberate life-cycle design that 
accommodates the realities of resource management and logistics (Blanchard and Fabrycky 
2011, 497). Consequently, the functional analysis serves to inform the selection criteria for 
the MMHEL Radar’s attributes and associated weights.  
In the final phase of the process, system design analysis combines a cost analysis, 
benefit analysis, and selection criteria with associated weights to produce the project’s 
main deliverable—a preliminary cost-effectiveness analysis that compares the radar 
alternatives. A risk assessment and sensitivity analysis accompany the preliminary cost-
effectiveness analysis to present a holistic body of evidence from which the project team 
makes a recommendation to the RCCTO about which radars to procure for further 
development and testing.  
C. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Functional analysis is necessary to clearly identify the functions a radar must be 
able to perform to be effective. This step of the systems engineering process assists in 
refining early requirements analysis, trade-off analysis, and the evaluation of system 
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effectiveness and cost (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 33). The MMHEL Radar functional 
hierarchy provides a foundational understanding of the system’s sub-functions and 
attributes that are required for it to be operationally effective. This foundational 
understanding serves as the technical underpinning for the cost-effectiveness analysis of 
the various radar solutions. Additionally, a preliminary trade-off analysis provides early 
system performance considerations for the RCCTO during its evaluation of alternative 
solutions.  
1. Functional Hierarchy 
The functional hierarchy shows the connection between the top-level system 
requirements and the functions, sub-functions, and lowest level attributes that make up the 
system configuration and enable the system to meet its requirements. Moreover, the 
system’s “hierarchical structure illustrates the critical top-down traceability” from critical 
function to lowest-level system attribute (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 139). The radar 
must demonstrate the ability to achieve four critical functions—detect, classify, and track 
targets, as well as interoperate with both the MMHEL and the Stryker’s command and 
control system (Figure 8). These functions were initially identified as part of the “mission 
success requirements” of the DRM earlier in this report and will be further explored in the 
following sections. 
 
Figure 8.  MMHEL Radar Primary Functions  
The first critical function of the radar is to detect enemy threat targets. Following 
this function, the radar begins to collect basic target information such as the target’s speed 
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and direction of travel. The radar detects targets by cycling radiation through its search 
sector and processing any reflections to confirm a target’s existence in its sector. The radar 
accomplishes this by “sending out a pulse of high-frequency electromagnetic waves within 
its search sector…until it encounters an object that reflects off of it” (Cloer 2017). While 
the concentration of emitted radiance depends on the beam width that the radar is capable 
of projecting, the radar determines target probability by computing reflected radiance and 
rejecting clutter through the fusion of unknown pixels. Simultaneously, the radar fuses “the 
results of the spatial and radiometric features which presents a target as an image” (Page 
et al. 2009, 3). The image is then “segmented…by using pixel radiance and pixel image 
position as features in order to partition the image” (Page et al. 2009, 6). Consequently, the 
radar reduces false alarm detection rates by evaluating target characteristic data along with 
developing the initial raw data that it will use to calculate a target’s position and heading. 
The “Detect” function is depicted in Figure 9.  
Figure 9.  “Detect” Function 
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 The second primary function of a radar is to classify targets. This is done by using 
look-up tables where the system compares the received target signature data against 
previously recorded data with similar features. Specifically, once an image is partitioned, 
“pre-computed” look-up tables are necessary to “enable real-time classification of the 
integrated reflected and emitted radiance components from the target surface” (Page et al. 
2009, 5). Target classification continues by using look-up tables produced over a variety 
of “look-angles and target altitudes from historical mission profile scenarios” (5). The radar 
completes this critical function by predicting the target threat after parsing all look-up 
tables and analyzing the compiled data, as depicted in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.  “Classify” Function 
 The third critical function in a radar’s target acquisition process is to track targets. 
The radar performs this function by refining its target track data with the continued 
reception of target reflections from the imaging geometry. The radar then correlates the 
size and brightness of the track with the strength and confidence of the signal received. 
Additionally, the radar receives distance, altitude, heading, and speed data from a spatial 
detection algorithm, which supplies the radar with “suppressed background clutter” while 
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clearly identifying the target profiles (Page et al. 2009, 10). “Tracking” remains continuous 
through stored heading and speed data until the threat is defeated or the situation dictates a 
target handoff. This function and its respective sub-functions are illustrated in Figure 11.  
Figure 11.  “Track” Function 
The final primary function of the radar is that it must interoperate with the four 
external systems identified in Figure 12. Unlike the first three functions, this function is 
unique to the MMHEL Radar. First, it must be able to achieve target handoff with peer 
MMHEL Radars. This means that the radar sends and receives stored tracking data from 
other MMHEL-equipped Stryker platforms. The radar’s ability to achieve this sub-function 
involves interoperating with the second external system, the MMHEL operator. Human 
factors engineering is important when considering the radar’s usability, which allows for 
crewmembers to effectively and efficiently operate the system. The radar must also 
communicate with the MMHEL’s fire control system, which enables the beam director to 
focus its energy on the target accurately. Lastly, the radar must be able to integrate with 
three applicable systems within the Stryker vehicle, or the host platform as labeled in 
Figure 12. The platform’s internal command and control systems must be compatible with 
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the radar to store and relay target data between computers and other network components. 
Therefore, the radar’s operational effectiveness relies heavily on the platform’s ability to 
provide support for the radar’s SWaP-C requirements. Specifically, the external thermal 
management system and external battery pack must connect to the radar and accompanying 
components that make up the MMHEL.  
 
Figure 12.  “Interoperate” Function 
2. System Trade-off Analysis 
The functional hierarchy allows for the identification of potential trade-off 
considerations that stakeholders may explore during the comparison of alternatives. 
According to Blanchard and Fabrycky, a good trade-off analysis considers “only those 
attributes that are essential to meet the requirements—not too many or too few…as 
measured in terms of the user needs” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 114). Consequently, 
the capstone team derived the following functional trade-off considerations by considering 
only the attributes perceived to have the most significant impact on the radar’s performance 
and its operational effectiveness.  
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• Target resolution for range: A radar’s resolution is dependent on the pulse
length, with a wider pulse longer-range radar providing less resolution, and a
narrow pulse shorter-range radar providing a “finer resolution” (Akerson
2018). This trade-off is important to consider because a radar’s ability to
differentiate between clutter and an actual threat directly influences the
MMHEL’s lethality and survivability. The applicable sub-functions are 1.1.2
Compute Target Probability (Figure 9) and 1.3.1 Develop Operational Picture
(Figure 11).
• Field of view for initial engagement sequence: Limitations to a radar’s field of
view, which consist of azimuth and elevation, will result in a delayed
engagement sequence, whereas an expansive field of view will significantly
reduce the probability that an enemy threat could evade detection,
classification, and tracking. The two most significant sub-functions that apply
within this trade-off consideration are 1.1.1 Emit Radiance Components
(Figure 9) and 1.4.3 Communicate with MMHEL FCS (Figure 12).
• Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for the probability of detection: Radar
performance depends on the SNR, “which is defined as the ratio of reflected
target energy to average thermal noise power” (Jeffrey 2009, 3). A greater
SNR will result in maximizing the probability of detection, whereas a lower
SNR will limit a probability of detection while maximizing the probability of
false alarms. The relevant sub-functions for this trade-off consideration are
1.2.1 Integrate Radiance Components (Figure 10) and 1.3.2 Reduce False
Detection Rate (Figure 11).
D. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
1. System Requirements Introduction
This section identifies top-level operational needs, specified system requirements, 
and system critical technical parameters. The operational needs were largely derived from 
this report’s design reference mission, an analysis of requirements provided by the 
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RCCTO, and current Joint Operational Access Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The 
RCCTO developed the majority of the MMHEL Radar requirements and the critical 
technical parameters outlined in this section as part of a technology maturation and risk 
reduction effort. The remainder of the requirements were developed based on the critical 
functions identified in the previous section. This section concludes by introducing certain 
system supportability factors that should be considered when choosing a radar alternative. 
2. Operational Needs 
The system must meet five top-level operational needs. 
• The system must be cost-effective for the purposes of outfitting multiple 
platforms in a Stryker Brigade Combat Team. 
• The system must be compatible with the Stryker vehicle platform. The system 
must be compact enough to fit on the Stryker body or be mounted on top to 
provide mobile capabilities. 
• The system must be capable of detecting RAM, UAVs, rotary wing, and fixed 
wing aircraft. This includes UAVs from classes I, II, and III. The detection 
distance requirements vary by target type. 
• The system must enhance the ground force’s common operating picture 
through early warning and discrimination of threat from friendly air platforms. 
• The system must be transportable by a C-17 aircraft and meet NATO 
Envelope “M” rail line transportability requirements. 
3. Requirements Definition and Traceability 
Table 7 outlines the MMHEL Radar’s specified and derived requirements, links 
those requirements to a pertinent top-level function, and provides a description and further 
context that support the requirement. For example, Requirement #1 states the various threat 
ranges that the MMHEL Radar must be able to detect. This requirement is linked to the 
top-level function of “detect,” and is necessary to support the MMHEL Radar’s target 
39 
acquisition sequence. Requirements are organized in Table 7 by the function they are 
linked to, with requirements highlighted in gray annotating those specified by the RCCTO. 
This traceability matrix reinforces the importance of each requirement and illustrates which 
system attributes are important for the follow-on comparative analysis. 
Table 7. Requirements Definitions and Traceability 
# Requirement Function(s) Requirement Description 
1 
The system shall be able to 
detect RAM (60 mm, 80 mm, 
and 120 mm mortars; 122 mm 
rockets; 122 mm and 152 mm 
artillery) at a range of 7 km 
(T) to 10 km (O). 
1.1 Detect The radar detection capabilities 
for rockets, artillery, and 
mortars enable the MMHEL to 
orient on incoming RAM by 
providing adequate time 
through a 7 km minimum 
detection range. 
2 
The system shall be able to 
detect Group 1–3 UAVs at a 
range of 10 km (T) to 30 km 
(O). 
1.1 Detect The 10 km threshold range is 
outside the maximum 
engagement distance for most 
armed UAVs. 
3 
The system shall be able to 
detect manned aircraft at a 
range of 50 km (T) to 60 km 
(O).  
1.1 Detect The larger RCS of manned 
aircraft allow the system to 
detect it at a further distance. 
This requirement excludes 
manned aircraft with known 
RCS reduction capabilities. 
4 
The system shall be able to 
classify and discriminate 
between various targets with a 
success rate of 90% (T) to 
95% (O). 
1.2 Classify The MMHEL radar 
distinguishes between the 
various target types to inform 
the beam control mechanism. 
5 
The system shall be able to 
distinguish between friend 
and foe with a success rate of 
90% (T) to 95% (O). 
1.2 Classify Distinguishing between friend 
and foe increases the 
effectiveness of the system by 
supporting the common 
operating picture of the ground 
force. 
6 
The system shall possess 
clutter rejection capability. 
1.2 Classify Clutter rejection enables the 
radar to distinguish between 
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# Requirement Function(s) Requirement Description 
 various targets based on the 
expected threat set.  
 
7 
The system shall possess an 
angular accuracy of no more 
than 500 microradians (T) to 
less than 300 microradians 
(O). 
1.3 Track The angular accuracy 
requirements enable the radar to 
inform the beam control 
mechanism and increase the 
predictive accuracy of future 
target location.  
 
8 
The system shall be able to 
track two or more targets 
simultaneously. 
1.3 Track A quasi-monostatic or 
equivalent system capable of 




The MMHEL radar shall 
possess a 360-degree FOV. 
1.4 
Interoperate 
Any hardware configuration on 
the Stryker platform, regardless 
of form, must yield a 360-
degree azimuth FOV.  
 
10 
The system shall possess an 
FOV elevation of 0 to 90 




Any hardware configuration on 
the Stryker platform, regardless 
of form, must yield a minimum 




The system shall transfer data 
at a rate that enables a high 
energy laser to achieve an 
engagement sequence of no 
more than five seconds. 
1.4  
Interoperate 
The high-energy laser requires 
the radar data to be transferred 
at a speed that produces a 
focused laser beam engagement 
of desired targets in no more 
than five seconds. This 
increases the likelihood that the 
threat is engaged before it 
engages friendly forces  
12 
The system shall have a mean 




Potential A2AD operating 
environment will be logistically 
constrained, making a low mean 
time to repair critical to 
maintaining a high state of 
operational readiness 
13 
The system shall have a 
reliability measure of .90 (T) 
and .95 (O)  
1.4  
Interoperate 
The system reliability is critical 
to successful integration within 
the SBCT. 
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4. Critical Technical Parameters
Critical technical parameters (CTPs) are key system characteristics that are 
normally used during system development (AcqNotes 2018). The MMHEL Radar’s CTPs 
enable the system to achieve the desired operational capabilities, and are focused on design 
features that must be realized through the development process. The following CTPs 
mostly include the size, weight, power, and cooling (SWaP-C) characteristics, which are 
common metrics used to evaluate a variety of defense systems.  
• Size. The system shall not exceed 12.5 cubic feet in volume. This is critical
due to the limited space available on the Stryker to mount additional
equipment.
• Weight. The system shall weigh no more than 750 pounds (T) to 500 pounds
(O). A radar exceeding this weight would significantly impact the Stryker’s
mobility.
• Power. The system shall consume no more than 10 kW of power. This metric
is not as great a concern as the previous two, as the MMHEL itself consumes
the majority of any additional power required. However, it is still important to
consider power shifting issues.
• Cooling. The system shall possess a passive cooling system. This is preferred
over active cooling to minimize ambient noise and other negative effects. The
system shall also be capable of maintaining an operating temperature between
50–82 degrees F (T) and 68–71 degrees F (O).
5. System Supportability Considerations
There are several supportability factors that must be considered when selecting the 
optimal radar to support the MMHEL. Considerations for system supportability should be 
driven largely by the system’s projected operating environment. The MMHEL’s use of 
directed energy instead of conventional ammunition results in a significantly lower cost 
per engagement, making it an ideal system to employ in a logistically-constrained 
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environment. This environment, illustrated in this report’s DRM, introduces unique system 
supportability factors that must be considered when choosing a radar alternative. One such 
factor is maintenance. Eliminating the need for ammunition resupply certainly does not 
alleviate the need for things like repair parts, lubricants, and other materials that may be 
unique to the MMHEL Radar. Similarly, supportability metrics like mean time between 
failure (MTBF), mean time to repair (MTTR), and mean corrective maintenance time (Mct) 
must account for the distance this system will be operating from maintenance support 
above the operator-level. For the same reason, reliability is a critical supportability 
consideration. While this particular metric is formalized as a requirement, additional 
consideration should be given to radars that possess a level of reliability beyond what the 
requirement dictates. Availability serves as the final critical supportability consideration. 
Availability is defined as the “probability that a repairable system will be functional at a 
given time, under a given set of environmental conditions” (Van Bossuyt 2019). Again, 
this consideration presents a particularly high level of significance for this system because 
of its projected operating environment. These supportability metrics should be heavily 
considered during the selection process.  
E. COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
The intent of the preliminary cost effectiveness analysis outlined in this section is 
to inform the RCCTO’s larger analysis of alternatives when selecting the optimal radar to 
support the MMHEL. While this analysis largely follows the process outlined in the Army 
Cost-Benefit Analysis Guide, a cost effectiveness analysis was chosen instead because it 
was deemed more useful to initially quantify the benefits and compare them to cost rather 
than express benefits in terms of dollars. This section will describe the methodology used 
to conduct the cost effectiveness analysis and analyze the cost and benefit of each 
alternative to set conditions for further analysis of risk and weighting sensitivity in the next 
chapter.  
1. Definition of Alternatives 
This analysis included 12 separate alternatives from six different vendors. Below is 
a brief description of each alternative by vendor. A comprehensive list of the critical data 
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and metrics for each alternative, including the metrics highlighted in this section, is 
consolidated in Table 8 located in the following section.  
a. SRC Inc.
The Syracuse-based defense contractor, SRC, submitted two separate alternatives 
to the RCCTO for consideration.  
• SR Hawk (V)2E (SRC Inc. 2017). The SR Hawk (Figure 13) is a long-
range ground surveillance radar (GSR) that is capable of providing the
desired 360-degree field of view. Its compact panel design enables it to be
vehicle-mounted and the 100 watts of power it requires is the third lowest
of the alternatives. It was designed to detect personnel, land vehicles, and
marine vessels. While the radar can also detect low-flying aircraft, its
maximum elevation of 55-degrees may limit its ability to perform
MSHORAD operations effectively.
Figure 13.  SR Hawk V(2)E. Source: SRC Inc. (2017). 
• SkyChaser (SRC Inc. 2017). The SkyChaser (Figure 14) is a multi-
mission radar (MMR) that is capable of tracking targets from a moving
platform. Like the SR Hawk, the SkyChaser is a compact panel capable of
being mounted on a vehicle and providing a 360-degree field of view.
Unlike the SR Hawk, however, the SkyChaser is designed to provide
short-range air defense, is capable of detecting targets at a 90-degree
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elevation, and is compatible with several existing military interfaces, such 
as the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).  
 
Figure 14.  Four SkyChaser Panels on an 
MATV. Source: SRC Inc. (2017). 
b. ELTA North America 
ELTA North America has three alternatives.  
• ELM-2026B (ELTA NA 2015). The ELM-2026B (Figure 15) is a Very 
Short-Range Air Defense (VSHORAD) radar designed to detect low-
flying aircraft and UAVs. Its panel design is 5.83 cubic feet, making it the 
largest of all panel alternatives. This is a key consideration given the 
limited space available on the Stryker to install additional equipment. The 
radar’s 15 km detection range surpasses the RCCTO’s threshold 
requirements for UAVs; however, it falls well short of the threshold 
requirement of 50 km for aircraft.  
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Figure 15.  ELM-2026B Single Panel. 
Source: ELTA NA (2015). 
• ELM-2138M Green Rock (ELTA NA 2019a). The ELM-2138M (Figure
16) is a tactical Counter Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars (C-RAM) radar
capable of detecting and tracking enemy indirect fire as well as UAVs and 
other low-flying aircraft. This radar is the heaviest of the panel 
alternatives, weighing 176 pounds. Its design also requires the radar to be 
placed on top of the vehicle, rather than be attached to the sides like other 
designs. While this would increase the Stryker’s profile, it also enables the 
radar to surpass the RCCTO’s objective requirements for detection ranges 
of UAVs, RAM, and manned aircraft. The ELM-2138M can only provide 
180 degrees of coverage, making it the only alternative that fails to 
provide the full 360 degrees of coverage.  
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Figure 16.  ELM-2138M Green Rock. 
Source: ELTA NA (2019a). 
• ELM-2180 Watchguard (ELTA NA 2019b). The ELM-2180 (Figure 17) 
is a man-portable GSR designed to detect dismounted personnel and 
ground vehicles. This radar is solely configured to provide stationary, 
ground surveillance and is incapable of being vehicle-mounted. 
 
Figure 17.  ELM-2180 Watchguard. Source: 
ELTA NA (2019b). 
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c. RADA Electronic Industries
RADA Electronic Industries, an Israeli defense company, has four viable 
alternatives to consider.  
• Enhanced Multi-Mission Hemispheric Radar (eMHR) (RADA 2016).
The eMHR (Figure 18) is a tactical air surveillance radar capable of
detecting every threat necessary to support the MSHORAD mission.
Similar to the other designs, one radar panel provides 90 degrees of
coverage, meaning four total panels would be required to provide the
desired 360 degrees of coverage. The eMHR consumes the most power of
the alternatives at 590 watts.
Figure 18.  eMHR Mounted on HMMWV. Source: 
RADA (2016). 
• RPS-42 (RADA 2019b). The RPS-42 (Figure 19) is a tactical air
surveillance radar designed to conduct VSHORAD operations. It weighs
slightly less than the eMHR radar, though it is nearly identical in design.
While it is capable of detecting a variety of UAVs and manned aircraft, it
is not designed to detect RAM. It is also limited to 80 degrees of elevation
instead of the 90 degrees offered by the other three RADA alternatives.
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Figure 19.  RPS-42 Single Panel. Source: 
RADA (2019b). 
• Advanced Compact Hemispheric Radar (aCHR) (RADA 2019a). The 
aCHR (Figure 20) is an MMR capable of detecting and tracking a variety 
of UAVs, RAM, and manned aircraft. It has the added benefit of being 
able to detect dismounted personnel and ground vehicles, something other 
air surveillance radars cannot do. The aCHR is designed to be attached to 
the side or on top of military vehicles, giving it an on-the-move capability.  
 
Figure 20.  aCHR Single Panel. Source: RADA 
(2019a). 
• Enhanced Compact Hemispheric Radar (eCHR) (RADA 2019a). The 
eCHR (Figure 21) is nearly identical to the aCHR in both design and in 
capability. The primary differences between the two is in size and weight, 
with the eCHR consuming approximately one half of a cubic foot more of 
space and weighing more than 20 pounds less than the aCHR.  
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Figure 21.  eCHR Single Panel. Source: RADA 
(2019a). 
d. Additional Vendors
Defense vendors Blighter, Leonardo, and FLIR each have one radar alternative for 
consideration.  
• Blighter – A400 (Blighter Surveillance Systems 2017). The A400
(Figure 22) is a medium-range air security radar capable of detecting both
manned and unmanned aircraft. The A400 is capable of being mounted on
a vehicle, however the vehicle must be stationary for the A400 to operate.
The A400 is not designed to detect rockets, artillery, or mortars.
Figure 22.  A400 Two Panels on a Mast. Source: 
Blighter (2017). 
• Leonardo – Osprey (Leonardo 2017). The Osprey (Figure 23) is a multi-
mode surveillance radar designed to be installed on rotary or fixed wing
aircraft. The Osprey is capable of detecting targets on land, air, and sea at
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up to 370 km. The Osprey is the smallest of all the radar alternatives at 
less than one cubic foot.  
 
Figure 23.  Osprey Radar. Source: Leonardo (2017). 
 
• FLIR – Ranger R20SS (FLIR 2015). The Ranger R20SS (Figure 24) is a 
ground-based surveillance radar capable of being mounted on a vehicle. 
While the Ranger R20SS is designed to detect land or maritime targets, it 
is also capable of tracking aerial targets if angled correctly. The radar is 
the second lightest of the 12 alternatives at 38 pounds per panel. Similar to 
the Blighter A400, the Ranger R20SS requires the vehicle its mounted on 
to be stationary in order to operate.  
 
Figure 24.  Ranger R20SS Radar. Source: FLIR (2015). 
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2. Data Overview and Estimating Methodology
The product specifications for each radar system in this market study are available 
on the competing companies’ websites. Each of the six vendors presented their product’s 
capabilities in different formats and measurements. The RCCTO provided five categories 
of interest to compare in order of precedence: panel size, panel weight, detection ranges 
for three target groups, the field of view (FOV), and power consumption. In order to 
compare the radars, the data in these categories required a degree of normalization before 
additive weights and scales could be applied to rank the items.  
The panel size represents the physical dimensions of the exterior object that would 
be mounted to the Stryker vehicle where length, width, and depth are multiplied and 
converted to cubic feet. SRC did not provide size dimensions for the SR Hawk. To develop 
a dimension, the panel size for each of the 12 systems was divided by its panel weight. The 
resulting values were averaged together to arrive at a factor of 0.0256. That factor was then 
multiplied by the weight of the SR Hawk to provide an estimate of the expected size. The 
same method was used for the ELM-2138M. The data used in this study also accounts for 
certain design differences among the various radar alternatives. For example, the panel size 
and weight for each system represents four panels with the exception of the ELM-2138M. 
The ELM-2138M’s current configuration does not allow for the installation of a separate 
panel on each side of the Stryker, as this system would require a raised top mount with 
only two panels. As a result, the size estimation of the ELM-2138M accounts for two panels 
instead of four.  
The detection ranges of interest are for groups 1, 2, and 3 UAVs, RAM, and rotary 
wing (RW) and fixed wing (FW) aircraft. While all companies provided range data in 
kilometers, some companies listed different ranges for different sizes of UAV. This study 
focuses on the detection ranges for standard-sized UAVs rather than ranges for UAVs more 
unique in size. This is primarily because every vendor listed at least one detection range 
for a standard-sized UAV, which provides for a more comparative analysis. As such, 
detection ranges listed in Table 8 reflect the detection ranges of the most standard-sized 
UAV, regardless of how many different ranges were listed. For example, the aCHR’s 
detection range is listed as 15 kilometers based on its advertised range for a “medium-size 
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UAV,” despite it also being capable of detecting a “nano-UAV” at three kilometers (RADA 
2019a).  
Only four of the radar data sheets explicitly state a capability to detect RAM. While 
every aerial threat radar has the capability to detect RAM to a certain degree, radars not 
specifically designed to do so may be unable to process the data needed to facilitate an 
engagement sequence. For this reason, detection ranges for RAM were not listed for the 
majority of radars included in the study.  
The Syracuse-based SRC does not provide detection range data for their products. 
To determine UAV detection ranges for the SR Hawk, the known detection ranges of all 
radar alternatives was averaged together to produce a 20-kilometer estimate. Detection 
ranges for the SRC’s SkyChaser were determined using an analogous comparison to 
RADA’s RPS-42, as both are similar in size, weight, and capability. Certain vendors did 
not list a detection range for RW or FW aircraft. For those radars, UAV detection ranges 
were used instead. It can be reasonably assumed that if a radar is able to detect a UAV at a 
certain range, it will be able to detect a target with a much larger radar cross-section at the 
same range. This substitution was made for the SR Hawk, the ELM-2180, the Ranger 
R20SS, and the Osprey. The Leonardo Osprey’s range data appears as an outlier because 
the system is intended to operate from a rotary wing aircraft. The detection range listed on 
the radar’s data sheet is 200 nautical miles, or 370 kilometers, which is significantly higher 
than any ground-based radar included in this study (ELTA NA, 2019a).  
Field of view consists of elevation and azimuth. Certain radars have a limited 
elevation based on the mission they were designed to perform. The ELM-2180, for 
example, was designed to perform ground surveillance, resulting in a maximum elevation 
of ten degrees. Most radars in this study provide 360-degree coverage through the 
combined efforts of four radar panels. The ELM 2138M, however, can only provide 180-
degree coverage because only two panels can be mounted on the Stryker. This is due to a 
combination of its significant size and design that requires it to be top-mounted and facing 
solely in one direction.  
The data for all twelve systems is consolidated in Table 8.  
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Table 8. MMHEL Radar Vendor Data 
3. Top-Level Screening Criteria
Three top-level screening criteria were applied to the 12 alternatives to determine 
their eligibility for further analysis. To be included in the cost effectiveness analysis, each 
alternative must be capable of performing MSHORAD operations, be able to be mounted 
on a ground vehicle, and be capable of operating while on the move. Each of these top-
level criteria is foundational requirements that are critical to employ the MMHEL as it is 
intended. Any alternative that failed to meet one or more of these criteria were not selected 
for further analysis. These alternatives are listed in Table 9.  
• Criterion 1: Perform MSHORAD. The first and broadest criterion is that the
radar is capable of performing MSHORAD operations. In basic terms, radars
must be capable of detecting aerial threats. This is the primary function of the
MMHEL, making any radar incapable of performing MSHORAD relatively
useless. Radar alternatives were considered to possess an MSHORAD
capability if they were able to detect one or more of the following: UAVs,
RAM, or manned aircraft. The ELM-2180 Watchguard is the only alternative
that fails to meet this criterion.
• Criterion 2: Vehicle-Mounted. The second top-level screening criterion is
that the radar is capable of being mounted on a ground vehicle. As outlined in
this report’s problem statement, the radar and MMHEL will be mounted on a
Stryker, making this criterion a central requirement. The ELM-2180
Watchguard and the Osprey fail to meet this criterion.
54 
• Criterion 3: On-The-Move Operation. The final criterion is that the radar is 
capable of operating from a vehicle in motion. This function is critical to 
enable offensive operations and to eliminate the current constraints of an off-
platform, stationary radar like the AN/TPQ-53. This criterion was the most 
exclusive, eliminating the SR Hawk (V)2E, the Blighter A400, the ELM-
2026B, and the Ranger R20SS from consideration. 




4. Cost Analysis 
The RCCTO provided cost data for the SRC SkyChaser, Blighter A400, and the 
RADA RPS-42. A parametric cost estimating method was applied to determine the costs 
for the remaining radar alternatives. This method used detection range as an independent 
variable to develop a cost estimating relationship, as detection range was identified as a 
major cost driver for radar systems. This study uses cost data from three analogous radar 
systems to generate three separate cost estimates for each of the remaining radar 
alternatives. These three estimates were then averaged together to produce a single cost 
estimate for each radar.  
The first cost estimate is based on the AN/TPQ-50, which is used as an analogous 
system because of its similarity to the different radar alternatives and the availability of its 
cost data in the Army’s 2017 budget justification to Congress. The AN/TPQ-50 is an Army 
vehicle-mounted counter-fire radar. The radar is too large to be mounted on a Stryker in 
Vendor Radar Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3
SRC SR Hawk (V)2E x
Blighter A400 x
ELTA NA ELM-2026B x
ELTA NA ELM-2180 x x
FLIR Ranger R20SS x
Leonardo Osprey x
x = failed to meet this criterion
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support of the MMHEL; however, the production cost drivers are presumably similar due 
to its comparable detection ranges and other capabilities. The Army Acquisition Support 
Center states the AN/TPQ-50 is capable of detecting RAM at ten kilometers (USAASC 
n.d.). The Army 2017 budget included two procurements for the TPQ-50: one procurement 
of 46 radars for $74 million to support full rate production and one procurement of 18 
radars for $26 million to provide an immediate capability to the European COCOM 
(Defense Budget 2016). Based on these numbers, the average unit cost for these two 
purchases is approximately $1.5 million. In order to arrive at a cost factor based on range, 
the $1.5 million is divided by the ten-kilometer detection range to calculate approximately 
$152,000 per kilometer.  
The remaining two estimates were based on the verified cost data of the SRC 
SkyChaser and the RADA RPS-42. The RCCTO provided an estimate of $8M for the SRC 
SkyChaser, which accounted for the four panels required to achieve 360-degree coverage. 
This estimate is divided by four to arrive at a price of $2M per panel. The $2M is then 
divided by the SkyChaser’s detection range of 30 kilometers, following the same 
calculation method used with the TPQ-50, to produce a factor of $66K per kilometer. The 
RPS-42 estimate was based primarily on a report from Arirang News that South Korea 
purchased ten RADA RPS-42 radars at a cost of $19M (Kim 2014). At a unit cost of $1.9M, 
the same calculation method used for the previous two estimates was applied using the 
RPS-42’s range of 30 km to produce a factor of $63K per kilometer.  
The cost estimates for each system are shown in Table 10.  




The advanced technologies included in the aCHR and eCHR may increase the costs 
of those radars significantly. Consequently, these features and their importance must be 
weighed by the RCCTO to determine their value in meeting the warfighter’s needs. While 
RADA markets these radars as having “unprecedented affordability,” the company’s 
marketing representative (email to author, September 6, 2019) declined to share the cost of 
these radars for this study. 
5. Selection Criteria and Weights 
A comparison of the six radars under consideration required the development of a 
decision support aid (DSA) using weights and scales. The DSA, which reflects the radars’ 
quantitative benefit score (Table 11), incorporates the preferences of the RCCTO and 
normalizes the data so that the radars are ranked according to the best features. 
Normalization is an important step because simply weighting the data would skew the 
results. For example, the smallest radar should receive the most favorable score; however, 
simply multiplying weight by size creates a scenario where the largest radar is scored the 
most favorably. The DSA normalizes the data by assigning a scale of one to the smallest 
radar; the scale of the other radars is then calculated by dividing the size of smallest radar 
by the size of the radar in review. In the case of detection range, the RCCTO prefers the 
radar with the highest range. Therefore, the radar with the highest range is assigned a scale 
of one. The scale of the other radars is then calculated by dividing the range of the radar in 
review by the range of the highest radar. For criteria where several radars have the most 
preferred value, such as a 360-degree field of view, each radar with the preferred value is 
assigned the scale of one.  
Each criterion on the DSA is assigned a weight based on the preferences of the 
RCCTO. The RCCTO provided the order of precedence as follows: size, weight, range, 
field of view, and power requirements. Size and weight are the most important with a 
combined weight of 50 percent because the radar must integrate into the Stryker vehicle 
without interfering with the vehicle’s other components and tactical operations. The radar 
size received a heavier weighting than radar weight because all radars in the study 
successfully meet the weight requirements by a significant margin. The detection range 
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weight of 45 percent is divided equally among the UAS, RAM, and aircraft target classes. 
The field of view is an important metric; however, all radars except the ELM-2138M 
provide the full 360-degree field of view. The DSA’s weights for FOV are smaller in 
comparison to other weights due to this strong similarity between the systems. The weight 
for power is relatively low for three reasons. First, the RCCTO specified that power is not 
a major concern because of how minor a radar’s power consumption is in comparison to 
the MMHEL itself. Second, the radar vendors reported this metric in inconsistent terms, 
with some listing peak power consumption while others listed average power consumption. 
Finally, each system far exceeds the threshold for power consumption.  




The DSA provides a weighted factor effect for each performance parameter by 
multiplying the raw data by the scaled value for the radar. The sum of the weighted effects 
ranks the radars, with the highest sum representing the radar with the greatest benefit to the 
warfighter. Further analysis is required to determine which radar provides the greatest 
benefit in terms of cost. The Cost Effectiveness Chart, found in Chapter IV of this report, 
multiplies the summed benefit factors by the projected per unit price of the radars. The 
resulting values reflect which radar provides the greatest benefit at the best price. These 
radars values are then ranked to provide the RCCTO a recommendation based on 
quantitative analysis. Other factors must be considered in addition to the ranking to 
determine the best radar to meet the warfighters needs.  
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6. Benefit Analysis 
The benefits of the post-screening radar alternatives include both quantifiable 
measurements and qualitative attributes. The project team quantified important physical 
characteristics and performance parameters using a ratio method described in the preceding 
section. However, there are instances where certain radar alternatives demonstrate unique 
capabilities that are difficult to quantify. Therefore, this analysis necessarily reviews both 
quantitative and qualitative characteristics to arrive at a complete overview of the benefits 
provided by each alternative. While the quantifiable benefits carry more weight, a 
comparative analysis that includes some discussion of qualitative benefits is useful, 
especially if there is negligible difference between the quantifiable benefits of competing 
alternatives (Department of the Army 2013, 48). 
a. Quantitative Benefits 
The DSA depicted in Table 11 captures the quantitative benefits of the various radar 
alternatives. The ELM-2138M radar provides the most quantitative benefit with a score of 
0.93, largely driven by its high detection ranges across the variety of aerial threats. It also 
weighs the least; however, this is because it consists of only two panels that afford 180 
degrees of azimuth coverage, which fails to meet the 360-degree requirement (ELTA NA 
2019a). The SkyChaser has the second highest benefit score at 0.64, primarily due to its 
relatively low size and weight. The four remaining RADA products have comparable 
benefit scores, offsetting comparative advantages over each other in size or weight with 
lower scores in other categories, like detection range. 
b. Qualitative Benefits 
Each of the post-screening radar alternatives has particular added capabilities that 
may not be quantifiable but present valuable decision-making considerations to the 
RCCTO. The SkyChaser, for example, is compatible with existing mission command 
systems such as the AFATDS, and so provides additional interoperability benefits. It also 
provides flexibility for the warfighter, as its array is designed to be modular with different 
mission configurations—for example, the radar panels can be stacked together to provide 
increased angular accuracy based on mission requirements (SRC Inc. 2017). Likewise, 
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RADA’s eMHR provides mission flexibility by offering multiple operating modes on one 
product, including the ability to tune the radar to mission-dependent sensitivity 
configurations based on likely threat signatures (RADA 2016).  
Mission flexibility is a common theme for RADA’s alternatives. For example, the 
RPS-42 allows for “examination of specific tracks while scanning is continued” (RADA 
2019b). Comparable in their quantitative benefits, the aCHR and eCHR have significant 
qualitative differences. The aCHR adds the capability of tracking ground targets in addition 
to aerial threats, which provides options to broaden the scope of the MMHEL’s use in the 
future. In contrast, the eCHR is designed to fulfill a Very Short-Range Air Defense 
(VSHORAD) mission, and so is acutely suited to detect low signature targets like nano-
UAVs (RADA 2019a). 
Conversely, the ELM-2138M’s design is not as flexible. The ELM-2138M is 
specifically designed to be affixed to the top of a vehicle, therefore increasing the vehicle’s 
tactical profile and possibly obstructing the view of the vehicle commander. This is a 
potential concern given that the Stryker platform is generally outfitted for combat 
operations with numerous items on top of the vehicle—ammunition, critical equipment, 
and counter-sniper netting—which could make the addition of a radar array problematic.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter’s objectives were to outline the project team’s systems engineering 
approach, establish traceability between system functions and system requirements, and to 
detail the process used to develop and execute the preliminary cost effectiveness analysis. 
The collective intent of these objectives was to provide readers insight into the 
methodology used by the project team to complete this research effort, which primarily 
consists of the preliminary cost effectiveness analysis. This analysis began with 12 radar 
alternatives and ended with 6 alternatives through the application of top-level screening 
criteria. Each of the remaining alternatives underwent a cost analysis and a benefit analysis, 
both qualitative and quantitative, to inform the comparison of alternatives. This comparison 
of alternatives, as well as the complete results of the cost effectiveness analysis, a risk 
analysis, and a sensitivity analysis, will be addressed in detail in the following chapter.  
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IV. RESULTS 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter offers further analysis of the radar alternatives and provides results of 
the cost effectiveness study. The analysis begins with an assessment of the risk associated 
with the MMHEL radar alternatives in an effort to better inform the decision process. While 
a more detailed risk analysis will certainly be necessary following the technological 
demonstration of initial prototypes in 2021, this assessment highlights top-level risks that 
should be considered when comparing alternatives and provides suggestions on how to 
mitigate these risks. A sensitivity analysis of the weighting used in the cost effectiveness 
study is then presented to highlight how manipulating certain weights may influence the 
results. The chapter concludes by delivering the results of the cost effectiveness analysis, 
which establishes the basis for the project team’s recommendations provided in Chapter V. 
B. RISK ANALYSIS 
This section analyzes the top three risks associated with the MMHEL radar 
alternatives. Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) explain that a risk analysis is conducted to 
“determine the ways in which the risk can be eliminated or minimized” and that some 
potential solutions are “determined through the accomplishment of design trade-offs” 
(692). Design trade-offs were part of the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter III, 
which identified areas of uncertainty related to operational performance, suitability factors, 
and vendor considerations. These primary areas of uncertainty are translated into top-level 
risks and are discussed in more detail below.  
1. Operational Risk: Detection Range 
A radar’s ability to detect targets at a range that enables the MMHEL to engage 
prior to itself being engaged is paramount to operational success. From a systems 
engineering perspective, the range at which a radar can accurately and precisely detect, 
track, and classify a target represents its relative technical maturity, and also presents the 
system’s foremost technical challenge to overcome. This is largely due to the technical 
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complexity involved in radar target detection, which includes detecting targets from a 
mobile platform that have a diverse set of radar cross-sections, travel at multiple speeds, 
are manned and unmanned, and are capable of engaging friendly forces. According to the 
Department of Energy’s Technology Readiness Assessment Guide, critical technology 
elements are at-risk technologies that are essential for the success of a project (DoE TRA 
2011, 8). The “at-risk” technology of the radar alternatives is the critical technology 
element of detection range (DoE TRA 2011). 
The detection range requirements specified in Chapter III of this report include 
UAV, RAM, and both rotary and fixed-wing targets. While no one system met all of the 
RCCTO’s threshold requirements, the only system that met every detection range 
requirement was the ELM-2138M. As such, the ELM-2138M presents the lowest risk of 
all the alternatives in this particular area. With the majority of the radar vendors self-
reporting detection ranges that fail to meet threshold requirements, the risk of selecting a 
radar that is unable to provide the warfighter the desired capability is significantly high. 
This underscores the high level of risk presented by detection range. 
From all the specified range requirements, the UAV detection range is the 
requirement best represented by all systems. RADA’s aCHR, eCHR, and eMHR met the 
10-kilometer threshold requirement, while the ELM-2138M, RPS-42, and SkyChaser met 
the 30-kilometer objective requirement. All systems selected for comparison met or 
exceeded the UAV detection range. Consequently, no radar presents a significant risk for 
UAV detection.  
Rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM) is not as well represented among the 
alternatives. The aCHR, eCHR, eMHR, and SkyChaser systems failed to meet the seven-
kilometer RAM detection range threshold. As such, these alternatives present a greater risk 
than the remaining two systems, the RPS-42 and ELM-2138M, which meet and exceed the 
threshold respectively. This risk is significant because RAM represents one of the fastest 
moving threat targets with relatively small radar cross-sections.  
The radar alternatives appear to be the least technologically mature in the area of 
manned aircraft detection. The ELM-2138M is the only system that meets the RCCTO 
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requirements for rotary and fixed-wing aircraft detection range. The remaining five 
systems failed to meet threshold requirements for manned aircraft detection range. As a 
result, manned aircraft detection is the largest capability gap among the radar alternatives.  
While the technical challenges are considerable, the risks associated with a radar’s 
ability to detect, track, and classify targets at an adequate range can be mitigated. One 
possible mitigation technique is to award the top two competitors with research and 
development contracts focused on further maturing the technology associated with 
detection range. Furthermore, a more critical inquiry into the effects of detection ranges on 
mission accomplishment could drive a revision of desired system requirements and enable 
the RCCTO to develop a more robust competitive range for MMHEL Radar alternatives. 
For example, further analysis might prove that an effective detection range for manned 
aircraft is actually much lower than the current threshold requirement. A revised 
requirement with a decreased range, which must be supported by thorough analysis, would 
lower the risk presented by current radar alternatives.  
2. Suitability Risk: Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability 
A commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) radar solution presents uncertainty related to 
operational suitability, primarily due to the lack of visibility acquisition professionals have 
on the solution’s development. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook defines operational 
suitability as “the degree to which a system is satisfactorily placed and operated in field 
use, with consideration given to reliability, maintainability, and availability” in conjunction 
with other factors (DAG 2018, 21). The risk associated with the operational suitability 
factors of reliability, maintainability, and availability (RMA) are especially high when a 
COTS item is integrated with a newly developed system, like the MMHEL. This risk is 
further elevated by the absence of operational data, resulting in the sole reliance on vendor-
reported data to evaluate the RMA metrics of each alternative.   
None of the six radar alternatives has been tested with the MMHEL. In one respect, 
this means each alternative presents an equal level of risk in regard to how integrating with 
the MMHEL might affect system RMA. Integration issues may also include that every 
alternative carries a certain level of risk that RMA metrics will be significantly degraded. 
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This report’s “System Supportability Section” highlighted the unique importance of RMA 
to this system, as the system’s projected operational environment will typically be located 
far from established logistical support. This risk is compounded by the critical assumption 
that the performance characteristics and physical specifications annotated in the collected 
vendor data are accurate, and that the radars can perform to those standards in an 
operational environment. While the vendors of all six radar alternatives report the RMA 
metrics of their respective radar, determinations of RMA should be “based on data from 
system use under operationally realistic…environments and planned operating conditions” 
(21).  
The RMA risk presented by both the integration of two different systems and the 
reliance on vendor-reported data can be reduced through testing and evaluation. While this 
solution appears obvious, its execution requires thorough planning and preparation. To 
assist in this, the DOD Guide for Achieving Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability 
recommends that the government organization request radar RMA levels recorded in 
commercial usage from the vendors being considered (DOD GARAM 2005, 1–19). This 
data would help clarify the information listed in the radar’s data sheet and establish more 
accurate metrics prior to entering testing. Further analysis could then be conducted to 
“determine the anticipated changes in RMA when using the COTS in a military 
application” (1–19). The testing and subsequent evaluation of these radar alternatives will 
significantly lower the risk associated with the RMA suitability metrics.  
Table 12 provides additional suitability factors for the RCCTO to consider prior to 
selecting an alternative. Each factor presents additional considerations unique to the 






Table 12. Potential RMA Issues. Adapted from DOD Guide for Achieving 
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (2005). 
 
 
3. Vendor Risk: Foreign-Based Options  
The RCCTO issued a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) for several advanced 
research initiatives, including air and missile defense and counter-A2AD capabilities (FBO 
2019). The BAA specifies that foreign firms should contact the RCCTO prior to submitting 
proposals. This could potentially be in part because of the risk associated with contracting 
with foreign-based companies to produce defense systems. One such risk is supply chain 
management. It is significantly more difficult to enforce standards within a company’s 
supply chain if the majority of the transactions occur overseas. A second risk is access to 
sensitive or classified information. Additional processes must be emplaced when working 
with a foreign-based company to safeguard any information that the company cannot 
legally view. The inability to access this type of information may also inhibit the company 
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from performing to their ability. Finally, contracting with a foreign-based company 
presents risks related to public policy. Defense acquisitions procedures are unique in that 
certain business decisions are influenced more by public policy than in gaining a profit. 
Contracting with a foreign-based company instead of a domestic company, which may help 
create jobs and stimulate the economy, exposes the program to potential scrutiny from 
external parties. These external parties could include a congressman who represents a 
district that would benefit from a defense contract, or protests from a domestic company 
that was competitive for the contract. These are the three primary risks associated with 
foreign-based vendors. 
The six systems selected for comparison are produced by three vendors. Of the 
three, RADA is the only foreign-based company. RADA, who produces the eMHR, RPS-
42, aCHR, and eCHR, is an Israeli-based defense contractor. As such, the RADA 
alternatives present the highest level of risk in this particular area. ELTA North America, 
which produces the ELM-2138M, is an American subsidiary of the Israeli company ELTA 
Systems Ltd. As a result, the ELM-2138M contains the second highest level of risk in this 
area, albeit significantly lower than the RADA products. The SkyChaser, produced by the 
American company SRC, presents the lowest risk.  
The risk associated with contracting with RADA has already been significantly 
mitigated through the company’s establishment of U.S.-based subsidiaries. RADA 
established a U.S. subsidiary, RADA Technologies LLC, in March 2018 as part of a joint 
venture with the American-based company Saze Technologies Inc. (RADA 2018). This 
risk can be even further mitigated by partnering RADA, if selected, with an American-
based defense company. A similar approach was taken by the Israeli defense company 
Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., that partnered with the American defense 
company Leonardo DRS to manufacture and deliver the Trophy Active Protection System 
(APS) for several M1 Abrams tanks (Freedberg 2019). Not only did this help streamline 
communications between the defense acquisition community and the vendors, it also 
simplified the supply chain management process and benefited the sustainment effort as a 
whole. The American-based subsidiaries and the frequency with which contracts are 
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awarded to foreign-based vendors makes this risk the lowest of the three presented in this 
section. 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
This section analyzes the sensitivity of the data results based on the selection 
criteria and their associated weights. According to Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011), a 
sensitivity analysis centers on a fundamental question: “how sensitive are the results of the 
analysis to possible variations of these uncertain input factors?” (589). In this study, the 
“uncertain input factors” are the weights associated with the selection criteria used to 
compare the competing MMHEL Radar solutions. The weights do not represent objective, 
scientific facts but are reflective of a decision maker’s preference and the warfighter’s 
needs. Therefore, the RCCTO and other decision makers must be informed on whether the 
overall results of this cost effectiveness analysis are changed by manipulating the relative 
importance of the selection criteria; and, if so, to what degree these changes occur. 
Consequently, this section puts forth three possible weighting variations alongside the 
RCCTO’s weights to analyze the impact on the overall outcome of a quantitative 
comparison. Finally, the sensitivity analysis concludes by testing the effect that cost has on 
the overall outcome. 
1. Possible Variations 
The relative weights and outcomes of the possible variations are captured in Table 
13. The first scenario is reflective of the sponsor’s input and serves as a comparative 
baseline. According to the RCCTO, size and weight are highly valued because of the 
limited space available on the Stryker’s exterior and the technological challenge of 
including all the system’s requirements within specified physical restrictions. Therefore, 
the weight of those two attributes is a combined 50%, followed by detection range and, 
lastly, the more standard attributes such as power and field of view. As a result, two of 
RADA’s products, the aCHR and eCHR, rank first and third respectively, while ELTA 
North America’s ELM-2138M ranks second.  
In a second scenario, all selection criteria are set to equal weighting. This scenario 
does not consider one attribute any more important than another, therefore complementing 
68 
the first scenario’s baseline. As a result, the top three radar alternatives remain unchanged; 
although, the ELM-2138M slips to third because the equal weighting of the attributes 
mitigates its comparative advantage in detection range. This indicates that the results will 
not significantly change if decision makers determine that all attributes are equally 
important.  
Detection range is the system attribute most closely linked to technical maturity, 
and as such could be considered the most important selection criteria. Therefore, the third 
scenario illustrates the impact of detection range on the overall outcome. Reflective of the 
need for superior detection range in an era of near-peer competition, the third scenario 
allocates a combined 75 percent of the weight to detection range. Under this weighting 
scheme, the ELM-2138M’s superiority in raw detection ranges propel it to first, while the 
two RADA products trail at a distant second and third. However, similar to the second 
scenario, the top three alternatives remain the same.  
The A2AD environment requires responsiveness and rapid target acquisition from 
its weapons systems, making it feasible to consider a 360-degree coverage capability as 
equally important as detection range. Accordingly, the fourth scenario assigns a weight to 
Field of View-Azimuth that is equal to the aggregated weight of the detection ranges. As a 
result, RADA’s aCHR, eCHR, and RPS-42 are ranked first to third respectively. As 
expected, this manipulation in weighting of the Field of View-Azimuth attribute dropped 
the ELM-2138M to fifth in the ranking. Of the three additional scenarios, this scenario 
resulted in the most significant changes, which highlights the sensitivity of the 







Table 13. Weighting Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
The final component of sensitivity analysis investigates the impact of the cost 
estimates used in the comparative analysis. Since the majority of costs are based on 
analogous estimates, this scenario mitigates any bias by assuming all costs are equal. 
Therefore, the cost sensitivity solely compares benefit scores using the RCCTO-informed 
attribute weighting. As a result, the ELM-2138M ranks first among the alternatives due to 
its comparative advantages in detection range, while SRC’s SkyChaser ranks second driven 
by its relatively smaller size and lighter weight. However, RADA’s aCHR still ranks in the 
top three alternatives. The complete results are illustrated in Table 14.  
The analogous cost estimates based off the AN/TPQ-50 are from 2016. This means 
current estimates based on that data could potentially be inflated if the cost per kilometer 
range has since decreased due to market competition and maturity of technology. 
Comparisons of the verified prices of the SkyChaser and RPS-42 from 2019 against the 
analogous cost estimates of those systems indicate that the competitive market of on-the-
move radars may well be starting to drive down prices. For example, the SkyChaser’s 
average price according to the analogous cost estimate is 42 percent higher than the actual 
price that the RCCTO provided. Likewise, the RPS-42’s analogous cost estimate is 49 
percent higher than the verified purchase made by South Korea (Kim 2014). Subsequently, 
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this study uses the verified prices for the SkyChaser and RPS-42 in its comparative 
analysis, which arguably provides them an advantage over other radars, where the study 
relied on an unverified analogous cost estimate due to a paucity of publicly available 
information. 
Table 14. Cost Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
2. Critical Factors 
Detection range is the most critical factor in affecting the outcome of the MMHEL 
Radar comparative analysis. The sensitivity analysis indicates that manipulating the weight 
of the detection range affects the ranking of benefit scores more than any other selection 
criteria. Whereas RADA’s aCHR ranks first in three of the four selection criteria sensitivity 
scenarios, it moves to second when the detection range is weighed as most important. The 
driver of this divergence is the variability between the raw detection ranges of the various 
radar alternatives. While the size and weights of all the radar alternatives are comparable, 
the ELM-2138M’s UAV detection range is more than three times that of the aCHR. 
Therefore, when the detection range is considered most important and weighed as such, the 
ELM-2138M predictably outranks the RADA alternatives as the top-choice radar. 
Cost is the second critical sensitivity factor. When costs are assumed equal, the 
ELM-2138M again outranks the RADA alternatives by almost twice the benefit score. 
However, the ELM-2138M’s cost estimate is more than three times more expensive than 
RADA’s aCHR and eCHR. Therefore, when cost estimates are applied the ELM-2138M’s 
comparative benefit advantages are nullified by its cost. 
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D. RESULTS 
The results indicate that the aCHR radar is the most cost-effective of the radar 
alternatives. While all the radar alternatives included in this study present unique 
capabilities, the aCHR provides the highest overall benefit at the lowest cost to the 
government. Figure 25 depicts the results of the cost-effectiveness analysis. Certain radars 
offer a greater benefit than the aCHR, but also have a significantly higher cost. The ELM-
2138M, for example, provides a benefit score of 0.927, almost twice as high as the aCHR’s 
score of 0.581. However, the ELM-2138M’s cost estimate of $9.4 million is also almost 
twice as high as that of the aCHR. Therefore, acquisition decision makers must determine 
if the ELM-2138M’s superior benefits are worth increased investment. 
 
Figure 25.  Cost Effectiveness Chart 
1. Key Findings 
This aCHR provides the best value to the RCCTO for a relatively small, on-the-
move, technologically mature, and cost-effective MMHEL Radar system. The aCHR 
ranked in the top three of all alternatives in all five decision-making scenarios in this 
analysis, scoring the highest in three of those five scenarios. Still, the aCHR’s cost estimate 
is assumed from analogous estimates and should be re-evaluated against comparative 
systems when verified cost estimates become available. The ELM-2138M provides the 
greatest detection range of all the alternatives; however, the scope of this study does not 
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include an analysis of the MMHEL’s physical dimensions and whether the ELM-2138M’s 
top-mounted design would interfere with the laser’s operation. Therefore, a determination 
that the ELM-2138M can provide 360-degree coverage if mounted counter-directionally 
on multiple vehicles requires further analysis and testing. If unresolved, the ELM-2138M 
can be eliminated from the comparative analysis altogether, leaving the aCHR as the prime 
candidate. 
2. Relevant Observations 
The sensitivity analysis indicates that the relative difference in benefit score 
between the top three radar alternatives is highly dependent on the weighting scheme. For 
example, under the RCCTO’s given weighting, the percentage difference in benefit 
provided between the highest-ranked alternative, the aCHR, and the third-ranked, the 
eCHR, is only ten percent. Likewise, under the equal weighting scheme, the percentage 
difference between RADA’s top two systems is only two percent, but this difference 
increases to 31 percent between the aCHR and the third-placed ELM-2138M. This result 
repeats itself when the weight of the detection range is equal to the weight given to 
coverage—the difference between the top two systems is negligible, but the difference 
between the top system and the third-ranked system is considerable. When detection range 
is considered the top priority, the ELM-2138M provides a benefit score that is 35 percent 
greater than the second alternative, the aCHR. Finally, when costs are assumed equal, the 
benefit of the ELM-2138M is 60 percent greater than the second-ranked alternative. 
Therefore, due to the variability in relative differences between these scenarios, a decision 
maker presented with these radar alternatives must ensure the pedigree of the available raw 
data and consider the weights used to evaluate the relative importance of the system 
attributes. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The project team has three recommendations. First, given the current available data 
as illustrated in Chapter IV of this report, the project team recommends that the RCCTO 
procure RADA’s aCHR for the MMHEL’s TRL 7 technology demonstration. While other 
systems, most notably ELTA NA’s ELM-2138M, provide more benefit, the aCHR 
provides the best value while also meeting all threshold requirements except for detection 
range. The aCHR’s detection range, while failing to meet the threshold requirement for 
RAM and manned aircraft, is likely to improve in the future as technology matures. 
Additionally, no radar system included in this study met all of the RCCTO’s threshold 
requirements, including the ELM-2138M, which presents significant compatibility 
challenges with respect to the Stryker platform due to its top-mounted design and inability 
to provide 360-degree coverage. Furthermore, the express intent of the MMHEL project is 
eventually to equip multiple Strykers in a BCT with the MMHEL capability, thus 
necessitating an inexpensive solution. The aCHR helps to achieve this overarching goal 
due to its relatively low cost. 
The team’s second recommendation is for the RCCTO to conduct further testing to 
verify the raw data reported by the vendors. The project team acknowledges that the 
MMHEL cost-effectiveness analysis relies on two fundamental assumptions. First, the 
study uses raw data from contractor fact sheets. Therefore, reporting bias certainly affects 
the pedigree of data, because objective third party testers have not verified the accuracy of 
the contractor data. Similarly, the project team relied on historical costs of analogous radar 
systems or contractor quotes to arrive at a cost estimate for most of the MMHEL Radar 
alternatives. While these cost estimates are certainly informed, they are inevitably 
imprecise. Consequently, the project team recommends that the RCCTO take steps to 
confirm the veracity of the data used in their own cost-effectiveness analysis. 
Developmental and operational testing can verify and validate the figures provided by the 
contractor fact sheets, while also illuminating qualitative benefits or shortcomings that are 
not addressed in this project’s analysis. Likewise, the team recommends that the RCCTO 
74 
commission a more detailed cost and price analysis of the various alternatives, as this 
project’s sensitivity analysis indicates that variances in cost estimates can affect the overall 
outcome of the cost-effectiveness study. 
Finally, the project team recommends that the RCCTO revisit its weighting of the 
desired system attributes to ensure that they accurately reflect the decision maker’s 
priorities. The sensitivity analysis indicates that the weighting of detection range is a 
critical factor in affecting the outcome of a MMHEL Radar comparative analysis, and so 
careful consideration must be paid to its relative importance. If it is later decided, for 
example, that 360-degree coverage is more important than what is currently reflected in 
the weighting scheme, or that size is not as important as originally thought, results of the 
analysis will be significantly different.  
B. CONCLUSION 
1. Summary 
Lieutenant General (LTG) L. Neil Thurgood, the director of the RCCTO, instructed 
his organization to leverage industry partners for new radar technology alternatives in 
support of the MMHEL rapid prototyping effort, to include its TRL 7 technical 
demonstration scheduled in the third quarter of FY21. The decision aligns with the office’s 
mission, which in part, states that it will “produce or acquire materiel solutions consistent 
with the Army’s modernization priorities that maximize Soldiers’ capabilities to deploy, 
fight, and win on future battlefields” (The Army RCCTO 2019). During a meeting with the 
project team held in June 2019, LTG Thurgood suggested that an academic research and 
analysis effort to assist the RCCTO in finding an effective radar solution would benefit his 
team by making an informed buying decision while maintaining their accelerated timeline 
objective. This capstone project was created as a result of that meeting and subsequent lines 
of communication were established between both parties to begin the collaborative effort. 
The result of this report is a recommended radar solution for the RCCTO to 
consider. The intent is to recommend a radar solution that effectively addresses this 
project’s problem statement: the U.S. military lacks a radar capable of guiding the Multi-
Mission High Energy Laser that is compact and inexpensive enough to equip select 
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Strykers in an SBCT with the capability to engage targets on the move. This project had 
three objectives. The following is a brief review of how this project addressed each 
objective. 
2. Project Objectives 
a. Inform the Army’s Search for an MMHEL Radar 
The project’s first objective was to inform the Army’s ongoing search for a 
compact, vehicle-mounted radar that enables the use of the MMHEL. The capstone team 
began this effort by framing the project through the consolidation of relevant background 
information related to previous high-energy laser development efforts and current radar 
assets to illustrate accurately the capability gap. The team first documented the Army’s 
past development of the Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL) and its most glaring 
limitation. The system was a physically large, fixed-site weapon that relied on a separate 
radar, positioned within relative proximity, to achieve target detection for the THEL. This 
system was defensive in nature due to its stationary position. The research was then focused 
on current radar assets within a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) that could support 
an MMHEL-equipped Stryker platform. Significant limitations were identified with the 
two radar types that are organic to an SBCT. First, the radars must be stationary to be 
operated, which severely constrains a Stryker’s ability to employ the MMHEL while 
maneuvering within its desired battlespace. The second issue is that the limited number of 
radars available to the SBCT places a constraint on when and where the radars are 
employed. As previously stated in Chapter I, these systems are used to protect mission 
command nodes and headquarters elements within the Brigade. These identified 
limitations, in combination with the research gathered on the THEL, presented a clear 
capability gap.  
The research was then centered on the Army’s need to further develop its laser 
technology by focusing on the size-to-capability ratio with the intent to utilize the weapon 
on a Stryker platform. The significance of this need was evident once the team illustrated 
how the MMHEL Radar system would nest within the current National Security Strategy 
(NSS). Figure 3 (MMHEL Radar Traceability Diagram) in Chapter II depicts how the 
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MMHEL provides a unique Mobile Short-Range Air Defense (MSHORAD) capability at 
the tactical level that also supports efforts at the operational and strategic level. This user 
need directly supports one of the six Army modernization priorities and can ultimately be 
traced to requirements outlined in the National Security Strategy. 
The RCCTO provided summaries of recent demonstrations using a Mobile 
Experimental High-Energy Laser (MEHEL) on a Stryker vehicle using 5-kW and 10-kW 
lasers as a proof of concept. These events helped define the system’s key performance 
parameters, which included the radar’s performance requirements used to achieve this 
objective. Additionally, the RCCTO shared their follow-on plan to conduct a TRL 7 
technical demonstration in 2021 utilizing a 50-kW laser integrated with a radar solution 
chosen from alternatives outlined within the research and analysis from this study. The 
objective to inform the Army’s ongoing search for a compact, vehicle-mounted radar that 
enables the use of the MMHEL was achieved by first identifying the capability gap, 
defining the user need, and obtaining the system’s key performance parameters. Second, 
the project outlined the mission success requirements that an MMHEL radar must achieve 
for its mission to be considered successful. In short, the mission success requirements 
comprise the four basic functions that the radar must perform to be effective, which are to 
detect, classify, and track targets, as well as interoperate with the MMHEL. The capstone 
team effectively linked the operational needs, as stated by the warfighter, with meaningful 
system requirements that systems engineers can use to evaluate the form and function of 
any proposed MMHEL Radar solution. 
b. Assist in Addressing Larger Issue of U.S. Military’s Potential Deficiencies 
in an A2AD Environment 
The project’s second objective was to assist in addressing the larger issue of the 
U.S. military’s lack of a mobile, ground-based mechanism for defeating a near-peer air 
threat in an A2AD environment. The team’s Design Reference Mission (DRM) produced 
a comprehensive and realistic operational scenario that illustrated how the MMHEL could 
be employed to address this issue. The DRM provided the means for achieving this project 
objective by providing a detailed narrative illustrating the employment of the MMHEL as 
a supporting ground-based asset in an A2AD environment. Additionally, the DRM serves 
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to enable further scenario-based wargaming, modeling and simulation exercises, and 
foundational planning for operational test events to address further this project objective.  
A mission background and Projected Operational Environment (POE) were created 
to present a realistic near-peer threat comprised of A2AD systems in a multi-domain 
environment. The mission background states the benefits of the MMHEL being employed 
in such an environment and how it can enable the U.S. Army to defeat its peer adversary. 
The POE offers an operational-level scenario overview and detailed operational situations 
(OPSITs), which introduce necessary variables to highlight the radar’s critical attributes.  
Near-peer threat details were researched and compiled to inform the system’s 
potential operational scenarios. The near-peer threat details included tier one, two, and 
three unmanned aerial systems, rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, and several rockets, 
artillery, and mortar systems, all of which could reasonably be encountered in an A2AD 
environment. This assisted in illustrating how the MMHEL could serve as a viable solution 
to the need for a mobile, ground-based mechanism capable of defeating aerial threats.  
c. Generate Viable Radar Alternatives and Provide a Recommendation 
The project’s final objective was to generate a list of viable radar alternatives and 
provide a recommendation to the RCCTO of the optimal solution. The capstone team 
applied systems engineering concepts to develop the functional hierarchy and system 
tradeoff considerations. The functions and tradeoffs that were identified will comparatively 
inform necessary criteria used for upcoming test and evaluation of the radar’s performance. 
Additionally, the effectiveness analysis in this study focused on the requirements and 
critical technical parameters provided by the RCCTO. This analysis reviewed ten radars 
that six different companies submitted in response to a request for proposal (RFP) in 2018. 
Through market research, the team identified two additional radars that became available 
in September 2019. Preliminary, top-level screening eliminated six radars because of the 
radars’ inability to perform the MSHORAD mission while mounted on a moving ground 
vehicle.  
The RCCTO emphasized their need to find a best-value radar which presented 
several challenges due to the limited availability of individual unit pricing for certain 
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alternatives. The costs for three radar systems were estimated using parametric techniques. 
Specifically, the analysis used verified costs from multiple “on-the-move” mounted radar 
systems to calculate a price-per-kilometer of range. This factor, multiplied by the range for 
the systems with unknown costs, provided an estimation that was formulated to identify 
the best-value radar. The RCCTO also shared their prioritization of requirements that 
guided the capstone team’s benefit weighting used in the effectiveness calculations. The 
data was normalized to compensate for combining attributes where preferential differences 
exist.  
The analysis then focused on generating multiple scenarios to determine how 
sensitive the results were to variable changes based on the inherit uncertainty of weighting 
criteria. In every scenario, RADA’s aCHR and eCHR radars were among the top three 
alternatives. The available marketing data suggests that the main difference between the 
aCHR and the eCHR is size and weight; however, further research may provide more 
insight on the performance differences between the two radars. The cost for both systems 
was recorded as equal in the cost effectiveness calculations because RADA would not 
provide their pricing data. The weighted scenarios also showed that the ELM-2138M 
performed well, but presented two notable limitations. First, this radar cannot provide a 
360-degree FOV for its host platform. The ELM-2138M can only achieve this requirement 
using multiple vehicles operating together, with the system being mounted counter-
directionally on each vehicle to provide the necessary coverage. The second limitation is 
that the panels are too large to be mounted on the side of a Stryker. This system’s top-
mount design would interfere with the MMHEL, and would inhibit other mission essential 
equipment from being stored on the top of the vehicle. The analysis suggests that if these 
limitations were perceived as acceptable risk, the ELM-2138M’s raw benefit score is 60 
percent greater than the aCHR due to its superior detection range capability.  
This project objective was achieved by incorporating the analysis mentioned above 
with identified areas of risk associated with the MMHEL radar alternatives to help inform 
the decision process. This analysis focused on operational risks related to range 
requirements, suitability risks related to reliability, maintainability, and availability 
(RMA), and foreign vendor risks that applied to five of the radar alternatives. The intent of 
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the risk analysis was to highlight assumptions related to the most significant uncertainty 
identified from our research and to provide suggestions on how to mitigate such 
uncertainties. As a result of this analysis, the team presented a list of six viable radar 
alternatives and recommended the aCHR as the optimal solution.  
3. Areas of Future Research 
This report serves as a critical step forward in the process of equipping multiple 
Strykers in a BCT with the capability to engage and destroy a wide variety of aerial threats 
using the MMHEL system. Due to the limited scope of this research effort, the project team 
recommends the areas of opportunity outlined in the following subsections for continued 
research using this project as a foundational reference. These recommendations are aligned 
with a variety of systems engineering management course materials to allow for the direct 
application of learned concepts and relevant tools. 
a. Modeling and Simulation 
The Design Reference Mission presents just one perspective on how the MMHEL 
Radar may interact with its operational environment. Therefore, model-based systems 
engineering techniques provide multiple pathways for future research projects. 
Specifically, a model of the MMHEL Radar, and a simulation of its interactions with its 
projected operational environment, holds great promise for further informing the Army’s 
ongoing search for a compact and on-the-move radar capable of guiding directed energy 
weapons. This recommended area presents an underlying opportunity to collaborate with 
the Modeling Virtual Environments and Simulation (MOVES) Institute at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. Leveraging the institute would facilitate achievable solutions while 
providing focused expertise and mentorship throughout the project. 
b. Test and Evaluation 
The project team readily acknowledges that the analysis in this report relies on 
publicly available, contractor-furnished data that has not yet been subjected to government 
tests. Therefore, as the RCCTO transitions a mature MMHEL capability to a program 
office, future research can lend support to the acquisition decision-making process by 
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constructing developmental and operational test scenarios. These scenarios can assist with 
the verification of any alternative’s ability to meet the warfighter’s requirements. 
Specifically, applications from the Naval Postgraduate School course SE4354, System 
Verification and Validation, may be utilized to assist the future program office with 
developing objective, defendable, repeatable, and traceable evaluations. 
c. Decision-Making Support Analysis 
Finally, the work undertaken by the RCCTO to develop the MMHEL is 
undoubtedly a long-term effort that is strictly focused on a limited quantity of prototype 
models in the near term. Therefore, future research can aid in the evaluation of FY23 
MMHEL Radar alternatives by providing system life-cycle analyses focused on the 
alternatives’ associated production learning curves and economies of scale. This 
recommended analysis may also be applied to MMHEL system quantities to assist the 
program office with its preliminary cost, schedule, and performance planning. 
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